

EUROPANOVA

Publications of the Scientific
Committee
2023

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Founder and chairman of Europanova, author of essays and reports on Europe, former director of the European Broadcasting Union, lecturer on European issues at HEC, ENA, Sciences Po and the College of Europe, and former advisor to the VP of the European Commission.



Olivier Costa,

CNRS Europe researcher, professor at Sciences Po and the College of Europe, author and editor-in-chief of the Journal of European Integration



Laurent Warlouzet,

Researcher in European history, CNRS author, professor at the Sorbonne in the history of European construction



Kolia Bénié,

Diplomatic advisor to the MEAE, health expert



Raphael Boroumand,
Professor of economics at PSB, energy and climate specialist, author, advisor to public institutions on energy strategies



Marc Nebojsa Vukadinovic,
Lecturer at Sciences Po and associate researcher at IRM-CMRP, expert on the Balkans



Olivier Coste,
Author and expert in the Tech sector



Sophie Pornschegel,
German-Brussels political analyst, author and columnist for the German press, professor at Sciences Po



Charlotte Norlund-Matthiesen,
Danish advisor to the European Commissioner for Transport, expert on democracy and citizenship



Emmanuel Rivière,
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French researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research, lecturer at Sciences Po Paris, Europe-Asia campus



Jean-Pascal Pham-Ba,
Co-founder of Paradigm Partnerships law firm, speaker, strategic advisor



Tremeur Denigot,
Vice-President of CIVICO Europa, European Commission education expert at the Joint Research Centre

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PhD student in political science/
international relations



Thomas Harbor,
Lawyer specialized in antitrust law



Victor Gout,
Master's student in Public Affairs and
Economics at Sciences Po, specializing
in European Affairs



Contact Scientific Committee

Isabelle Négrier

EuropaNova Executive Director

isabelle.negrier@europanova.eu

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Publication of EuropaNova's Scientific Committee

POLICY PAPER BY EUROPANOVA

Author : Marc NEBOJSA VUKADINOVIC
Coordination : Isabelle NEGRIER



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1. Introduction

The YouthEU projects incorporates both top-down and bottom-up approaches to educating and empowering youth on the EU and their role as European citizens through webinars, workshops and engagement with EU stakeholders in Brussels. During implemented activities, students discussed how they perceive the EU and what they consider the biggest challenges to its prosperous future. The project also provides an opportunity for experts and policymakers to gain insight into the attitudes of young people towards the EU and European integration while creating a platform through which the youth can discuss and exchange their views of the EU and learn about the European project. This Policy paper present proposals made by students about the fight against climate change, including Renewable energy, Pollution and Transport. In the second part, it presents concrete recommendations for policy makers. It present students' input, followed by the expert assessments. The result of debates between students is not only to give youth sentiments on problems in environment such as climate change and pollution but also to highlight crucial questions of the future. In this sense, recommendations from youth can serve as a basis to build a better European future.

2. Issues raised by the students during the Brussels workshop

During the meeting and discussions organised with French, Greek, Serbian and Czech students, Issues regarding climate change, pollution, transportation and energy consumption have been raised.

The first concerned nuclear energy, and the debate surrounding its role in different territories of the European Union. They wondered whether this source of energy should continue to be developed, or if investments in nuclear power should be brought to a halt. They mentioned the risk involved in the construction of power plants, whilst also raising a question of democratic significance surrounding this issue: which countries are willing to take on the risk of having multiple nuclear power plants on their territory when they know the potentiality of a nuclear incident? The economy of nuclear power is again in debates since the energy crises due to the war in Ukraine. In several EU countries, such as France, it was an important topic during the presidential elections and several right oriented parties are in favour of development of nuclear power plants.

Another issue evoked by the students was that of immigration. Questions were raised surrounding financial expenditures in this domain: instead of spending considerable financial resources to deport migrants, why is this spending not being redirected towards the development of reception infrastructures to help refugees, in so doing demonstrating the European continent's humanity and solidarity? In this sense integration policies for refugees and asylum seekers with associated investments should be more focused to help their employability and integration in EU members countries societies.

Finally, the environmental issue was also discussed. On this topic, the debate focused on energy and the question of increasing investment in renewable energies. The main interest point was the manner such investments are to be made. The renewable energy have been developed in EU members countries during the last two decades, more specifically solar and wind energy but there is still a need to continue efforts in their development and implementation. It is also important to take into consideration some limitations such as transportation via transition lines of wind energy from wind farms, they also generate noise. Concerning hydroelectric, even if hydroelectric power does not generate pollution, they use fossil fuel to pump water. In addition, in some countries, such as Western Balkans countries, small hydroelectric power plants have negative impacts on nature and negatively affects animals and ecosystems. In recent years they were also sources of environment conflicts. Concerning other sources of renewable energy, such as ocean energy, biomass, hydrogen and geothermal energy there are also benefits and limitations. Students are aware about both aspects. When it comes to climate change issue, causes of global warming have also been discussed.

3. Proposal made by the students about the fight against climate change

The Proposals made by the students cover three main issues: renewable energy (A), pollution (B), and transportation (C).

A) Renewable energy

Students developed a reflection about future methods of functioning for the European energy system. First, students made a proposition about revising the role of member states in designing a trajectory for the energy system. They believe that the EU should subsidise publicly owned syndicates, and develop policies and aid instruments in addition to existing focused on urban and rural areas, all the while also granting said subsidies to small companies which produce renewable energy. Funding schemes should be at two levels, EU and Member States (MS) level. In this sense there is a need of improvement of coordination between MS in order to develop more coherent funding instruments.

Secondly, they discussed the European Union's energy, including electricity and gas energy sharing mechanisms. Their proposition is as following: in addition to the established grid, energy should be shared within the EU through a common transportation system. The electricity grid could be better integrated. The connection of this system to non-member states – aspiring or not to join the EU - in situations of need should also be considered. For instance, if there is an overproduction of electricity in a European country, said country should be able to send it to other members states, which find themselves lacking in energy. This would serve as a symbol of the EU's values of solidarity on the question of energy, which is currently a source of many challenges.

Finally, students questioned the balance between the different types of energy sources: the national energy mix. According to them, renewable energies should be prioritised with nuclear energy only acting as a backup. They argue that the EU should not support the building of large nuclear power plants as these are costly and time-consuming. Subventions should instead be used to build smaller reactors. However, they were opposed to an entire shutdown of nuclear energy as implemented by Germany.

B) Pollution

With regards to pollution, the students' propositions focussed on the issues of control and regulation. First, they made propositions in favour of penalising environmentally damaging behaviours. They believe that the European Union should design sanctions for those releasing CO₂ when emissions cross a threshold defined by the EU. Sanctions should also be implemented for those releasing toxic substances in water, air and land via industrial production. Moreover, they specified their proposals relating to fishing: according to them, the European Union needs to ensure compliance with the fishing quotas assessed for each member country of the Union. Then, they worked on the topic of meat production and consumption, given that this sector bears a large responsibility in CO₂ emissions. They are in favour of limiting the number of animals kept in slaughterhouses and instating a limit on the production of meat.

C) Transport

Finally, students focused their attention on the issue of transport, which is the leading cause of carbon emissions. According to them, the EU should heavily subsidise public transport throughout the EU, thus granting alternatives to driving for people to perform their daily work commutes. Beyond such subsidies, the students believe that the EU should set a common policy, which would penalise the purchase fossil-fuelled cars, thus incentivising the use of electric cars. The EU should also encourage riding bikes with a program that gives money to people who opt to use this mode of transport, replicating the system put in place in the Czech Republic.

Figure 1 : Le réseau de transport d'électricité européen



4. Part 1 – Student exchanges with an expert: future challenges for the environment

A) Energy


On the topic of energy, we will focus first on the students' proposition to create a sharing mechanism throughout the European Union. It must of course be reminded that EU member states already share their energy through a common European market for energy. There are currently 305,000 kilometres of connections throughout the continent and more than 400 interconnections, which link approximately 600 million European citizens. For instance, a project for a new interconnection between France and Spain is ongoing, and the line is supposed to enter in operation in 2026. Following the same line of thinking, France (RTE) and Italy (TERNA) will lead a renovation of the Savoie-Piémont electrical line, and a new subsea Powerlink 'Celtic Interconnector' will be built between France (RTE) and Ireland (EirGrid) and supported by the European Commission's Connecting Europe Facility Energy Programme.

As we can see, efforts have already been made by the European Union to reinforce exchanges and to renovate the equipment connecting EU member states.

The students' proposition is thus particularly relevant: the European Union could allocate a bigger part of its budget to the creation of new lines, or to the improvement of the energy transportation capacities of older lines. Because the creation of these lines is time-consuming, and because we want the EU to achieve energy independence as soon as possible, the EU should continue its efforts in this direction in the following years.


Moreover, there is a huge heterogeneity in terms of energy production between European countries. As we can see on the figure below, the leading producer of electricity is Germany, followed by France, Italy, Spain and Poland.

Therefore, if we want to reinforce the links between countries, we need to take into consideration these disparities, thus allowing support to be focussed on the states which do not have the same capacity for independent energy production.



Gross energy available from EU member states
Source : Toute l'Europe, data from Eurostat

European electricity consumption ranking (in %)
Source : Quiestvert



We are now going to focus on the students' idea to prioritise renewable energy development over nuclear energy.

All the European countries do not have comparable quantity of renewable energies in their energetic mix. As we can see on the map above, Northern countries are far more advanced in the use of renewable energies than Central and Eastern European countries.

As such, if the EU is to subsidise renewable energy on the European continent, it should prioritise granting subventions to countries where renewable energy has not yet been developed. The lack of investments is not de facto due to lack of funding, but often lack of political will and protection of vested interests amongst influential stakeholders. It is uncertain at best that subsidies would change this without a political will. In this sense, the EU could invest in promotion of renewable energy and support more strongly civil society organisations involved in environmental issues in order to influence local political actors. Another question is linked how subsidies could be granted and timeframe for potential phase-out in order to promote a stable environment for investments. However, other subventions need to be implemented for countries whose economies are based on the production of high carbon emitting energy because a transformation of their energy model could have negative consequences on employment and on the economy as a whole.

Thus, there is considerable heterogeneity between all member states, and this aspect needs to be considered by the European Union in order to adapt the distribution of subventions and support where it is most necessary.

There is also a need to mention the project of the European Green Taxonomy, which is part of the Green Deal voted by the European Parliament. This taxonomy considers gas and nuclear energy as green and positive energies for the ecological transition, which means that they could benefit from subsidies even though the green dimension is questionable - albeit 'only' as transitional energy sources. The thought process behind this taxonomy was to invest in energies that are better than coal, for instance; however, in the students' opinion, the European Union could have been more ambitious. This decision was reached after intense lobbying from the Czech Republic, Hungary and France, whose energy models include a large proportion of nuclear energy.

B) Pollution

The students' proposition will first focus on environmental criminality, and then on the production and consumption of meat in the European Union.

First, environmental criminality is a huge threat for citizens of the EU as they could find themselves directly impacted by the dissemination of toxic substances, which represents an important sanitary risk. Additionally, classifying environmentally harmful behaviours as a crime could encourage awareness about environmental issues more widely.

The European Commission adopted in 2008 a directive (2008/99/EC) about environmental protection through criminal law, which represents a significant first step in the fight against environmental crime. However, there is a lack of harmonization of sanctions between EU member states on this question.


Moreover, because the text adopted is a directive, states have a certain degree of freedom in its application in their national legislations. Consequently, national texts resulting from the directive are not ambitious enough, and there is currently a deficit in the application of said directive.

In this regard, the students believe that reinforcing environmental sanctions in situations of non-environmental-friendly behaviour is relevant in addressing the aforementioned challenges.

Furthermore, on the specific question of fishing quotas, enhancing controls could provide financial resources to the European Union, while guaranteeing the respect of marine biodiversity. As an illustration, illegal fishing alone, according to reports by Interpol and UN Environment Programme of 2016, was a more important source of income than small arms trafficking.

Secondly, it is well known that the meat production sector is highly polluting, because of the methane expelled by cows and the carbon footprint of livestock feed. It must also be highlighted that this pollution is due to this industry's massive need for water.

For instance, all types of livestock combined emit approximately 7,000 million tons of CO₂ equivalent. Moreover, the EU is highly dependent on vegetable protein imports to feed its livestock, like soybean, coming mostly from deforestation projects in Brazil, therefore deepening Europe's imported deforestation problem.




Thus, the students' proposition is to limit the production of meat. Nevertheless, a limitation of production necessarily implies negative consequences on the concerned sector, namely in terms of employment. As such, producers' interests must also be taken into consideration. In addition, limiting the production of European producers will not reduce our imported carbon emissions as consumption of meat produced by non-European countries will continue.

Concerning the carbon impact of meat, the first area on which we could act is European citizens themselves. We should first start by creating a European awareness campaign on the negative impacts of meat over-consumption.

As livestock benefits from support of the CAP, we could decrease the subsidies granted to meat production little by little, in so doing encouraging farmers and herders to move their production towards produce which emits less CO₂.

C) Transportation




With regards to transport, the focus will be on the penalization of fossil-fuelled cars purchase as well as the development of a European program to encourage European citizens to buy and ride more bikes.

The penalization of the fossil-fuelled cars purchase is particularly relevant because the main factor of air pollution in transport is cars, a mode of transport which represents 60% of greenhouse gas emissions, as described on this chart from the European Environment Agency.

However, this 'tax' or 'tariffs' could take several forms given that different modes of penalization could be implemented. The penalization could be financial with penalties for those who choose to purchase fossil-fuelled cars, as is the case in France. Thus, this system could be put in place on an EU scale, and the tax could be added to national ones, in order to minimise impacts on the EU member states' established systems.

According to environmental economists, the taxation system is very useful to orient behaviours. In the case of transport, people need to assure their movements for personal and professional reasons and, as such, this right to move cannot be infringed upon without obstructing fundamental values. That is why an EU tax on fossil-fuelled cars could be relevant.




Source : Lanxess

It must also be mentioned that the European Parliament adopted a text in June that will prohibit the selling of combustion vehicles by 2035. Considering this, this proposed taxation system could function as a sort of preparation pre-empting this strict prohibition.

On the other hand, the idea of privileging electric cars is relevant because even if the process of production of electric vehicles is not environmentally neutral, carbon dioxide emissions are much lower with electric cars than with alternatively fuelled cars, as we can see on this diagram.

Finally, the students suggested that European subventions be put in place to help people with bike purchases, so that they can more easily use this mode of transport in their daily lives. This idea could also further future civic cooperation with European policymaking, as such a measure would illustrate that EU legislation can have a concrete impact on the lives of European citizens. Bike infrastructure could be developed.



Several initiatives have been developed during the last decade, such as Eurovelo but urban bike infrastructures could be developed in European cities. The graph shows the mode of transportation for residence place to work place in 2015 in France with a clear conclusion that the distance is a key factor in adopting a transportation mode between car, public transports, bike and walking.

This idea could lead to a reduction in the use of cars for short distance trips. As we can see on this diagram, in France, people use their car 58% of the time they have to travel a distance less than 1 kilometre. If each citizen were to be equipped with a bike, the carbon emissions of these short travels could be avoided.

Nevertheless, all these proposals would need to be completed by robust public transport systems, as argued by the students, because public transport allows for a reduction of CO2 emissions by pooling the need to move.

Finally, the students highlighted that a discussion is to be had on urbanisation as it is at the root of a major pollution issue: the energy consumption and the carbon footprint of cities in their globalisation are extremely high, and these emissions are incompressible. Therefore the students believe that there is a need to create a new green model for cities in light of the increased carbon footprint of urban citizens.

5. Part 2 – Concrete recommendations for policy makers

Drawn from the discussions with the students, we would like to offer the following policy recommendations.

A) Energy

Concerning energy, we would argue that European action should be mostly financial, expressed through the subsidising of renewable energies for countries where such systems remain undeveloped. The EU should help countries' economies that are based on the commercialization of fossil energies in their transition towards more environmentally conscientious economic models.

Moreover, we would advocate for heavy investment in the development of infrastructure for the transportation of energy, thus creating new lines connecting countries.

Finally, the last part of the financial action of the EU on the topic of energy could be the financing of research and development in addition to existing programs such as Horizon Europe, to make the EU a pioneer in the innovations of the energy system of tomorrow.

B) Pollution

With regards to the criminalization of environmentally unfriendly behaviours, we should look towards the creation of an agency to fight against such behaviours. It could include investigation services, scientific entities, a procurer, judges at a local and regional level.

In addition, this agency could coordinate the actions of national actors, who are implicated in the preservation of the environment, all the while also creating public-private partnerships to fight against environmental criminality. The agency can also be a way to force openings into the national/local political environments. The agency can also contribute to legislative changes.

This idea is inspired from the proposal of the Council of the European Union of 2016. Some agencies have already been put in place, such as EnviCrimeNet or Ambitus, but the fight against environmental crimes is fragmented across several agencies, including CEPOL, FRONTEX, Eurojust, the European Agency for the Environment and OLAF. As such, these agencies do not have sufficient financial resources to act on this mission.

Our proposal, inspired by the students, would be to reorganise these entities, in so doing enhancing their financial capacities and ultimately reinforcing their efficiency.

C) Transport

We believe that to encourage a change in European citizens' behaviour towards the purchase of electric cars instead of fossil-fuelled cars, the policies should not be entirely financial as the current state of economic inequality could provoke a rise in social conflict. For this reason, the European Union should propose a system for parking spots, where certain places are reserved for electric cars, and where fossil-fuelled cars are prohibited. This discrimination does not have a direct economic dimension, and does not therefore create nor reinforce social inequalities. This will prevent the ecological transition becoming synonymous with social discrimination.

Another essential dimension to consider is the funding dedicated to research and development in the field of transport. Indeed, electric cars do not have a neutral carbon footprint, and cooperation at the European level could allow us to find other technological alternatives to electric cars, or at least improve their carbon balance. Thus, under the umbrella of Horizon Europe program, a research program should be put in place by establishing relations between researchers from all over the European Union, in so doing aggregating the efforts and the capacities of European research. New modalities, such as the fast-tracked research cooperation mechanisms that were deployed during the COVID-19 pandemic (which had Horizon amongst others as the umbrella) should be developed. Those could be both fit for the purpose of preventing climate breakdown.

Moreover, by finding the future methods of "green-transport", the European Union could benefit from the economic resources gained thanks to the commercialization of these innovations.

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POLICY BRIEF – Environmental issues in the Western Balkans

Author : Marc NEBOJSA VUKADINOVIC
Coordination : Isabelle NEGRIER

ABSTRACT

Environmental issues in the Western Balkans are at the crossroads of civic mobilization processes against the negative effects of various types of pollution and the process of integration into the European Union. In addition, during the post-socialist period a dependent capitalism has emerged in Western Balkans countries, particularly as a result of increased dependence on foreign investments and international aid. In this context, the article analyses the economic development and consequences of dependent capitalism on the environment. It analyses also how process of European integration impact on environmental issues as well as the role of local actors and how they are reflected in public policies. The significant increase in civil society actors acting in the field of environment has created a new situation in recent years. In this sense, the article questions the concept of environmental democracy in the Western Balkans.

Environmental democracy in the Western Balkans between dependent capitalism and integration into the European Union

Nebojsa Vukadinovic¹

Since the 1990s, following pressure from environmental movements, the question of the consequences of competitiveness on the environment has led to economic studies that take environmental issues into account. Among these, the “Michael Porter hypothesis” places the environment at the service of productivity and competitiveness². Here, regulations and standards are central because they push companies to transform their production methods and would have beneficial effects on the environment. Michael Porter’s hypothesis is thus based on performance and profits from changes in production methods. Even if according to this assumption the winners are on both sides, environment, and companies, in the end, there are all the same “winners and losers”. In the case of Western Balkans countries, the introduction of European regulations and standards has been topical in recent years. During this period, the priority is placed on rapid privatizations, the closure of many unprofitable companies as well as banks. The relationship between savings and productive investment disappears completely. During the last two decades, the focus was on FDI (Foreign Direct Investment,) which does not arrive at the expected level. Thus, privatizations were mainly for the benefit of people enriched during the previous period and regimes of 90s. However, during the last decade, Chinese investments as well as Gulf countries, Turkey and the arrival of some multinational companies from different countries have changed the situation. A dependent capitalism has emerged in the Western Balkans particularly as a result of increased dependence on foreign investment. Despite a period of slowdown in foreign direct investment in the Western Balkans during the period of the Covid 19 pandemic, the gradual exit from the pandemic has seen a significant increase in Foreign direct investment, in particular towards Serbia which recorded in 2022 an increase of 27.9% compared to the year 2021. China invests in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in old technology in the energy sector that pollutes the environment. While, for example, coal provides cheap energy, buildings are outdated and pollute the environment. Moreover, the lithium mining projects in Serbia by the Anglo-Australian multinational company Rio Tinto have been followed by actions of local NGOs against these projects and have seen the emergence of environmental conflicts which have led to changes of position of local governments. So, environmental issues in the Western Balkans have become topical over the past decade. and more particularly in recent years with a significant increase in the number of NGOs active in this sector. The process of integration into the European Union has also made it possible to highlight environmental issues through reforms in connection with the negotiations of the chapters of the Community acquis and the announcement of the Green Deal for the Balkans.

1 Senior Lecturer at Sciences Po Paris (campus of Dijon)

2 BOIRAL Olivier, « Concilier environnement et compétitivité, ou la quête de l'éco-efficience », *Revue française de gestion* 2005 / 5 (n°158), pp. 163-186.

In this context, environmental issues are at the crossroads of civic mobilization processes against the negative effects of various types of pollution and the process of integration into the European Union. Is it therefore possible to speak of an « environmental democracy » in the Western Balkans ? What are the consequences of dependent capitalism on the environment in the Western Balkans ? How does the process of European integration affect the consideration of environmental issues in public policies in the Western Balkans ?

The concept of « ecological - environmental democracy »³ has been developed during the last three decades with an extensive literature⁴. The environmental democracy index is based on several composite indicators with clear distinction between three pillars: a) free access information on environmental problems and quality, b) participation in decision-making and c) enforcement of environmental laws. These indicators can be considered as fundamental rights of citizens. They are also based on possible impacts of citizens on decision-making processes and on public policies. Contribution of civil society organization to the Green Agenda in the Western Balkans as part of the EU accession process has been highlighted by the EU and embedded in several declaration⁵. The relation between environment and economic development is more complex. Despite some research that are part of regulationist thought, according to Sandrine Rousseau and Bertrand Zuideau « it is clear that they are too few and insufficiently coordinated to form a true regulationist theory of the environment. In fact, the integration of the environment into the regulationist corpus remains an exercise that is still largely unfinished. In this sense the contribution of Louison Cahen-Fourot and Nelo Magalhaës is interesting because these authors introduce the « socio-metabolic dimension »⁶. The concept of “metabolism” makes it possible to study the “physical units of energy and matter that enter and leave (waste, emissions, etc.) from an economic system »⁷. In the case of Western Balkans countries, the model of neo-liberal capitalism of the last twenty years is based on a « socio- metabolic regime » which is characterized by an intensive use of resources and materials at the national level with a strong negative influence on the environment, In this context, environmental issues are at the crossroads of civic mobilization processes against the negative effects

3 BABERAND F. Walter, BARTLETT V. Robert. « Deliberative Environmental Politics - Democracy & Ecological Rationality ». Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2005, 276 pp

4 PICKERING Jonathan, BACKSTRAND Karin, SHLOSBERG David, Between environmental end ecological democracy : theory and practice at the democracy-environment nexus, *Journal and Environmental Policy and Planning*, vol. 22, 2020, Issue 1. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1523908X.2020.1703276>

5 <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/contribution-civil-society-green-agenda-and-sustainable-development-western-balkans-part-eu-accession-process-own/related-links-rex-528>

6 CAHEN-FOUROT Louison, MAGALHAES Nelo, « Matter and regulation: socio-metabolic and accumulation regimes of French capitalismsince 1948 », <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02554906/document>.

7 CAHEN-FOUROT Louison, MAGALHAES Nelo analyzes over a long time the periodization in socio- metabolic regimes (agrarian, industrial, etc.) from the case of France as well as the biophysical dimensions of economic activities as well as their ecological compatibilities. (Presentation at the Regulation Seminar on 12.01.2021)

of various types of pollution and the process of integration into the European Union.

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The concept of “metabolism” makes it possible to study the “physical units of energy and matter that enter and leave (waste, emissions, etc.) from an economic system »¹². In the case of Western Balkans countries, the model of neo-liberal capitalism of the last twenty years is based on a « socio-metabolic regime » which is characterized by an intensive use of resources and materials at the national level with a strong negative influence on the environment, with a significant impact of industrial pollution on public health. power, limited energy efficiency, high rates of energy poverty despite generally high levels of subsidies, limited market mechanisms and private sector participation. The energy sector in the Western Balkans is still characterized by insufficient and obsolete infrastructure, high dependence on fossil fuels, late adoption of renewables except for residential biomass and hydropower, limited energy efficiency, high rates of energy poverty despite generally high levels of subsidies, limited market mechanisms and private sector participation.

8 BABERAND F. Walter, BARTLETT V. Robert. « Deliberative Environmental Politics - Democracy & Ecological Rationality ». Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2005, 276 pp

9 PICKERING Jonathan, BACKSTRAND Karin, SHLOSBERG David, Between environmental and ecological democracy : theory and practice at the democracy-environment nexus, Journal and Environmental Policy and Planning, vol. 22, 2020, Issue 1. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1523908X.2020.1703276>

10 <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/contribution-civil-society-green-agenda-and-sustainable-development-western-balkans-part-eu-accession-process-own/related-links-rex-528>

11 CAHEN-FOUROT Louison, MAGALHAES Nelo, « Matter and regulation: socio-metabolic and accumulation regimes of French capitalism since 1948 », <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02554906/document>.

12 CAHEN-FOUROT Louison, MAGALHAES Nelo analyzes over a long time the periodization in socio- metabolic regimes (agrarian, industrial, etc.) from the case of France as well as the biophysical dimensions of economic activities as well as their ecological compatibilities. (Presentation at the Regulation Seminar on 12.01.2021)

Socio-economic development and environment in former Yugoslavia

After the Second World War and mainly after 1948, Yugoslavia embarked on a model of socialism different from other Eastern European countries characterized by self-management and the establishment of a « socialist market economy ». This had multiple advantages since it made it possible to create competition, develop production and integrate the national economy into the world economy. Two antagonistic tendencies that must be reconciled are therefore present at the political and economic level. One aims to strengthen decentralization at the level of companies and municipalities, the other, predominant, aims to strongly maintain the centralization of power through the League of Communists, a single party. At the same time, Yugoslavia experienced a process of reconstruction with “brigades and work actions” in which the Communist Youth League took part from 1946 until the 1970s by organizing a massive mobilization of youth. Moreover, the accelerated industrialization of the country based on the steel industry, the exploitation of mines and the creation of very large national companies has harmful consequences on pollution problems¹³.

The economist Branko Horvat proposes a chronological breakdown of Yugoslav economic development by periods as presented in the table above for the period from 1945 to 1988 (phase A). From the beginning of 1990, macro-economic stabilization and the transition to a market economy began, as in the other countries of Eastern Europe. Then from 1991, Serbia, like the other countries resulting from the federation, entered a post-Yugoslavian period (phase B). The phase after 1945 is that of post-war reconstruction. During this first period, GDP growth per capita was 40% between 1945 and 1951. The reconstruction process will span several decades. In this context, after 1951, we witness the introduction and development of self-management¹⁴. The period of the 1960s was marked by radical liberalization measures which were introduced in 1961 and 1965, mainly « in the direction of increasing the autonomy of companies»¹⁵. Indeed, the reforms¹⁶ of the organization of the self-management system provided that decisions on investments should be taken at the level of AWOs (Associated Work Organizations) to reduce their dependence on banks and thereby avoid their indebtedness. But in 1968, investments were mostly still financed by banks. In addition, wages kept rising, causing inflationary pressures. In 1967, takeovers and mergers of companies are authorized in the self-managed sector of the organization of the self-management system provided that decisions on investments should be taken at the level of AWOs to reduce their dependence on banks and thereby avoid their indebtedness. But in 1968, investments were mostly still financed by banks. In addition,

13 VUKADINOVIC Nebojsa, « Géoculture de l'environnement en Serbie » (The Geo-Culture of the Environment in Serbia), *Balkanologie*, Vol16, n°2, 2021, <https://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/3618>

14 SAMARY Catherine, *Le marché contre l'autogestion, l'expérience yougoslave*, Editions La Brèche Publisud, 1988, 331 p.

15 BILANDŽIĆ Dušan, *Certains aspects du système yougoslave d'autogestion*, Belgrade, *Međunarodnapolitika*, 1968, 63 p.

16 CARIĆ Slavko, STANOJEVIĆ Obrad, *Privredno i radno pravo. Pravni položaj privrednih organizacija*, (Le droit économique et le droit du travail. Le droit des organisations économiques), Novi Sad, *Visoka škola za organizaciju rada*, 1968, 201 p

wages kept rising, causing inflationary pressures. In 1967, takeovers and mergers of companies are authorized in the self-managed sector¹⁷. This will result in a tendency towards the emergence of monopolies. In addition, foreign direct investment (less than 50%) is authorized from 1968, as well as the creation of small private companies, mainly in tourism and trade. The period of the sixties is still marked by a growth in GDP per capita which will last until 1979 « reaching an increase by 5 between 1951 and 1979 »¹⁸. Throughout this period, the self-management model works but dysfunctions appear. According to Wladimir Andreff, the self-management system generates « two specific dysfunctions, and not the least embarrassing, which ultimately condemn it in terms of economic efficiency : it systematically creates unemployment and inflation »¹⁹. Some economists, such as Branko Horvat²⁰ or Aleksander Bajt were aware in the 1970s of the interaction between self-management, unemployment, and inflation. The vicious circle that had set in can be described as follows: the income of companies being distributed among those who work there, a new « recruitment is only collectively advantageous if its productivity at work is clearly higher than the collective average productivity »²¹. As companies have a monopoly on their market, they will act on prices. This situation pushes on the one hand the companies to recruit little and on the other hand to increase the prices to increase their receipts and thus their incomes. The period of « polycentric statism or the contractual economy » characteristic of the 1970s and 1980s was marked by the development of contractual relations between self-managed structures in companies.

The “economic institutional relations between the republics, the Federation and the municipalities”²² from 1945 to 1990 could work because the League of Communists made it possible to maintain cohesion, political centralization in a largely decentralized system, but they had negative consequences on the environment²³. Indeed, despite the establishment of self-management, there was an intensive use of natural resources. As in Western European countries, coal was widely used during the decade of the 1950s. But unlike some Western European countries which reduced coal production by choosing nuclear power in the 1970s, Yugoslavia remain on a line of exploitation of traditional energy resources with harmful consequences on the environment. A lot of laws have been adopted in the period of 60s-80s. All these laws have been proscribed in 1991 and each new country from former Yugoslavia has adopted separate new legislation.

17 BAKARIĆ Vladimir, *Aktuelni problemi sadašnje etape revolucije*, (Les problèmes actuels de l'étape de la révolution), Zagreb, Stvarnost, 1967, 366 p.

18 Op.cit. https://yuhistorija.com/serbian/ekonomija_txt01.html

19 ANDREFF Wladimir, *La crise des économies socialistes, la rupture d'un système*, Grenoble, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1993, p. 183.

20 HORVAT Branko, *Lutanja jugoslovenske privrede*, (Wanderings of the Yugoslav economy), Ekonomski pregled, Zagreb, 1993, p. 550-565.

21 ANDREFF Wladimir, *La crise des économies socialistes, la rupture d'un système*, Grenoble, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1993, page 183.

22 DUROVSKI Lazar, *The Commune and the communal system of Yugoslavia, 1941-1978*, Skopje, Institut za sociološka i političko-pravna istraživanja, 1981, 658 p.

23 PETRIĆ Hrvoje, ZEBEC SILJ Ivana, *Environmentalism in Central and Southeastern Europe: Historical perspectives*, Editions Lexington Books, 2017, 304 p.

Table 1 : Economic development and impact on environment in former Yugoslavia (SFRY - Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)¹ (1945-1990) and after the transition from communism to capitalism (1990-2021) / desintegration of former Yugoslavia.

Phase		Economic periods	Dates	Impact on environment (1)
A	a	<i>Controlled economy</i>	1945-1951	XX
	b	<i>Self-management period</i>	1952-1964	XXX
	c	<i>Economic liberalization and political democratization</i>	1965-1971	XXX
B	d	<i>Contractual economy</i>	1972-1987	XXX
	e	<i>Nationalism</i>	1988- ... ¹⁸	XXX
	f	Macroeconomic stabilization and « blocked transition » ¹⁹	1990-2001	X
	g	Macroeconomic stabilization, structural reforms and economic international integration	2001-2012	XXX
	h	Macroeconomic stabilization, structural reforms and EU integration	2012-2023	XXX

Phase A : SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)

Phase B : After the disintegration of Yugoslavia (SFRY)

a-e : periods of economic development in Yugoslavia (SFRY)

f-h : periods of economic development during the transition from communism to capitalism and the disintegration of former Yugoslavia (SFRY)

(1) Impact on environment : X Low impact ; XX Medium impact ; XXX High impact

1 République socialiste fédérative de Yougoslavie

2 HORVAT Branko, « Lutanja jugoslovenske privrede », in Ekonomski pregled, Zagreb, 1993, pp. 550-565.

3 MOROKVASIC Mirjana, VUKADINOVIC Nebojsa (dir.) « Sortir de la transition bloquée: Serbie- Monténégro », Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. 35, 2004, Voir https://www.persee.fr/issue/receo_0338-0599_2004_num_35_

After the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, and especially at the end of the 1980s, Yugoslavia found itself faced with several economic problems: hyperinflation, increasing foreign debt and shortages. However, despite the positive effects of the macroeconomic stabilization program implemented on January 1st, 1990, as in most Eastern European countries for the transition from communism to capitalism, the rise of nationalism will destroy the reforms in progress. In this context, to Branko Horvat's classification, it is necessary to add other periods to understand the evolution of economic development in the former and post- Yugoslav space after the disintegration of Yugoslavia until today (from 1990 to 2021). During this period, the beginning of 1990 marked the beginning of the «transition» reforms with the implementation of macro-economic stabilization (Marković plan), following the example of what is happening in Poland (plan Balcerowicz) under the impetus of the IMF and the Washington Consensus. The wars of 1991 to 1999 have deeply marked all the countries resulting from the Yugoslav federation, The fall in production of the 90s was so strong that it is still felt today. The production levels of 1989 are still not reached more than thirty years later. This sudden fall in production will however make it possible to attenuate, or even reduce the negative effects on the environment until 1996. However, the situation is more contrasted when we look more closely since the production of lignite has not not decreased, but considerably increased over the last twenty years with negative repercussions on air quality.

The experience of reintegration of Western Balkans countries in the global economy after the period of conflicts and the process of enlargement of the EU since the beginning of 2000s, shows that the enlargement process has a positive impact on the flow of Foreign Direct Investments. All East European countries have registered in that period a significant increase of FDI. Nowadays the situation is similar in the Western Balkan countries. In 2019 before the COVID 19 pandemic, the Western Balkans countries saw an increasing in foreign direct investment. This contrasted with the trends of declining FDI both globally and in the wider Central, Southeast and Eastern Europe (CESEE) region. Western Balkan countries have been gradually converging to the European Union.

However, due to different reasons, including transitional issues, macroeconomic factors as well as internal and external shocks, the real convergence of the Western Balkans region to the EU average is relatively slow. However, macro-economic stabilization programs in place for many years, have produced conditions for the development of the private sector and attraction of FDI. Nominal convergence usually provides a stable macroeconomic environment as a favorable floor for real convergence. In this context, EU enlargement has provided a positive framework for the macro-economic stability. Despite of improvements in relation to previous years, positive trends in FDI flows, economic stability, estimated growth rates and economic benefits of EU accession at the country level and good macro-economic indicators, the region continues to suffer from chronic problems, such as continued high levels of unemployment, resistance in implementation of reforms, lack of regional economic plans and lack of internal investments policies.

Dependent Capitalism in the Western Balkans and Environmental issues

The period of macro-economic stabilization and the « blocked transition » in the economic and political sphere has profoundly modified the social stratification with a minority of winners and a mass of losers. This period is also characterized by a loss of values and a profound change in beliefs. In this context of crisis and then

conflict, the informal economy and trafficking have become the rule. Finally, inequalities have increased, the Yugoslav middle class has practically disappeared, and a privileged category has benefited from the largesse of the regime, or has taken advantage of the embargo against Serbia. On the contrary, retirees are in an extremely precarious social situation. Moreover, as Catherine Samary points out, one of the characteristics of the transition in Serbia is its « radicalization in the direction of liberalism since the end of the 1990s »²⁴. Since more than two decades, economic reforms have been introduced in rapid waves and slowdowns, which is characteristic of a shock therapy transition followed by a « stop and go » period. The priority is placed on rapid privatizations, the closure of many unprofitable companies as well as banks. The relationship between savings and productive investment in the financial systems disappears completely. The focus is on FDI which has not arrived at the expected level has contributed that the privatizations has mainly benefit to people enriched during the previous period of the 90s.

Since the Second World War and up to the present day, changes in production and consumption patterns have had an impact on the environment²⁵ in Western Balkans and evolves according to the phases of economic development. Insofar as a “social market economy” was in place, production followed logics of competition. The influences of agricultural production were also felt on air quality, ecosystems and waste.

Energy consumption and production also had a negative influence on air quality and gas emissions. In addition, individual and collective mobility, and the development of transport during the period from 1952 to 1990 had a negative influence on air quality and gas emissions. During this period, the self-management system in which there was a logic of competition relied on an intensive use of labor with productivity gains. This had negative influences on the environment. From the 1990s to the present day, rail transport has been reduced considerably because of wars and lack of investment. Thus, road transport has become the main mode of transport between cities, thus contributing to air pollution.

Since the beginning of 2000, a neo-liberal economic model has been put in place in all Western Balkans countries which became a constant in the formation of capitalism²⁶ in the region. For more than two decades, economic reforms have been carried out without any real reflection on the logic of the sequences of reforms to be implemented or on their consequences. For example, privatizations have been carried out rapidly between 2001 and today, sometimes without corporate restructuring. Moreover, financial system reforms have been slower than privatizations. In this context, there have been in many cases privatizations for the benefit of the old political and economic elites from the 90s.

24 SAMARY Catherine, « Réinsérer la Serbie dans l'analyse de la transition, rapports de propriété, Etat et salariat » in MOROKVASIC Mirjana, VUKADINOVIC Nebojsa (dir.) «Sortir de la transition bloquée : Serbie- Monténégro », Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. 35, 2004, pp. 117-156.

25 OSTRIC Zoran, « Ekološki pokreti u Jugoslaviji – građa za proučavanje razdoblja 1971-1991, Socijalna ekologija, n°1 (January-March) 1992, pp.27-30

26 AMABLE Bruno, Les cinq capitalismes. Diversité des systèmes économiques et sociaux dans la mondialisation, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 2005, 378 p.

The energy sector and consequences on environment: heritage and perspectives

The energy sector in the Western Balkans is still characterized by insufficient and obsolete infrastructure, high dependence on fossil fuels²⁷, late adoption of renewables except for residential biomass and hydropower, limited energy efficiency, high rates of energy poverty despite generally high levels of subsidies, limited market mechanisms and private sector participation. Environmental problems are linked to the dilapidated energy systems and the dependence on traditional energy sources (mainly coal). The high air pollution in some area and the water pollution are in relation to the energy heritage from the former Yugoslavia socialist period. Air pollution, particularly in urban and industrial zones, notably stemming from outdated coal-fired power plants is also a major cross-border issue in the region. Also, drinking water supply and discharge of wastewater are additional key concerns in the Western Balkan. At the same time, the region is rich in biodiversity which needs to be protected, while sustainable managing of water supply, wastewater and waste disposal is crucial. In addition, poor waste management is linked to low investments in this sector and low municipal incomes.

In the recent period, Chinese investments in mines in Serbia and in the steel mill have resulted in environmental degradation. In addition, the mini hydropower plants in Serbia and Bosnia-and-Herzegovina have caused significant damages. The use of lignite also aggravates the pollution situation. Added to this are the investment projects of the multinational companies, such as Rio Tinto in Serbia which have provoked disputes and environmental conflicts. The Western Balkan region is therefore facing a unique double transition: moving from centralized state-controlled systems to open and competitive markets, and moving towards decarbonization. These are at the same time the most important Pillars of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans that are in line with the Green Agenda²⁸. During the past decade there has been an awareness concerning environmental questions in Western Balkans. The number of NGO dealing with environmental issues has increased significantly in recent years. Therefore, the debates on energy and the question of increasing investment in renewable energies and the manner how such investments are to be made are relatively present. In this context, local governments have adopted National Energy Strategies that have the main goal of providing a secure energy supply and promoting compatible energy reforms in accordance with the Energy Community Treaty (ECT)²⁹. In addition, a regional approach in planning the energy sector investments is expected to decrease the overall investments needed to meet regional energy demand through increased energy trade. The transition from highly polluting coal to more sustainable and green sources of energy production is a key point for the region to meet its commitments under the Paris Agreement. The EU is therefore presenting a « Green Agenda for

27 See <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/201391544823541838/pdf/Western-Balkans-Energy-Directions-Paper.pdf>

28 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1811

29 <http://www.energycommunity.org>

the Balkans »³⁰, as foreseen in the European Green Deal. This Agenda is formed by five broad areas covered by the “Green Deal”: decarbonization, depollution of air, water and soil, circular economy, farming and food production, and protecting biodiversity. The war in Ukraine since 2022 has also highlighted the energy question in the Western Balkans and the question of dependence on Russia. Concerning the vulnerability to climate change, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) identified the Western Balkans as one of the most vulnerable areas to climate change in Europe³¹.

Environmental democracy and Integration of Western Balkans into the European Union.

During the period 1960-1991 the Legal framework and public policies related to environment followed the evolution of the Yugoslav socialism. The environmental activism of the « Gorani movement »³² was organized as a youth organization similar as the organization of the youth socialist organization. The ideological dimension was therefore present in the law and youth organizations. Since 1991 and until nowadays, many legislations have been adopted in all post-Yugoslav countries with a lack of participation of NGO and the academic sector in the preparation, the definition and implementation of the legislative framework in all Western Balkans countries. Only in recent years with an important development of the NGO sector dealing with environmental issues the situation started to change. In addition, environmental conflicts in recent years as local levels mainly focused on small hydroelectric plants the relation between environmental damages and corruption has been highlighted by local NGO. The Rio Tinto project for lithium exploration in Serbia revealed « pressures on government »³³ and was the occasion of important manifestations against the project in autumn and winter 2021. Faced with mass demonstrations the government decided to back down with this project. Following the three pillars approach of environmental democracy, this event demonstrated that the environmental activism has led to changes in governmental position through information, participation and enforcement. Environmental democracy is also reflected in the Public Policy Cycle, namely in Agenda setting, Policy formulation, Decision-making, Implementation and Evaluation. The role of civil society organization in the environmental sector has been taken into account in programming, implementation and evaluation of EU pre-accession IPA funds and currently IPA III framework (2021-2027)³⁴ with impacts on the Public Policy Cycle in all Western Balkans countries.

30 See https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-10/green_agenda_for_the_western_balkans_en.pdf

31 <https://www.iucn.org/news/eastern-europe-and-central-asia/202008/water-our-ally-adapting-climate-change-western-balkans>

32 VUKADINOVIC Nebojsa, « Géoculture de l'environnement en Serbie » (The Geo-Culture of the Environment in Serbia), *Balkanologie*, Vol16, n°2, 2021, <https://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/3618>

33 Dragojlo Sasa, Mladenovic Ivica, « Serbia's lithium is Rio Tinto's perfect project », *Le Monde diplomatique*, November 2022, <https://mondediplo.com/2022/11/10serbia>.

34 Concerning IPA III Framework Window 3 (Green Agenda and Sustainable connectivity) https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-01/C_2021_8914_F1_ANNEX_EN_V5_P1_1462290.PDF, pp.36-44.

The COVID-19 pandemics in 2020 – 2022 brought massive disruptive effects on the Western Balkan countries in terms of economic convergence with the EU, facing the ongoing challenges of low competitiveness, high unemployment, and a significant brain drain. The need to intensify joint efforts by implementing structural reforms, overcoming structural weaknesses, strengthening innovation potential, and accelerating the green and digital transition – also in view of their future in the EU – is more pressing. Therefore, in October 2020, the European Commission adopted a comprehensive Economic and Investment Plan (EIP) for the Western Balkans³⁵ which aims to spur the long-term recovery - backed by a green and digital transition - leading to sustained economic growth, implementation of reforms required to move forward on the EU path and bringing the Western Balkans closer to the EU Single Market. Alongside the Economic Investment Plan to support the region, the European Commission presented guidelines for the implementation of the Green Agenda in the Western Balkans, adopted at the Western Balkans Summit in Sofia in November 2020 that aims at mirroring the EU Green Deal and presents tailored solutions for bringing the region one step closer to climate neutrality by 2050.

Indeed, it foresees activities related to climate (including decarbonization, energy, and mobility), circular economy (including waste, recycling, sustainable production, and resource efficiency), biodiversity (aiming to protect and restore the region's natural assets), combating air, water and soil pollution and sustainable food systems and rural areas. Digitalization will be the key to achieving the above five pillars, in line with the concept of the dual green and digital transition. This should help make the region more attractive for investment and tourism and unlock the significant economic potential of a green economy. The success of the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans depends on the commitment of all actors: the EU, international financial institutions, bilateral donors, international organizations, and beneficiaries. Considerable efforts are needed from all partners to coordinate activities, plan and implement this agenda in a way that enhances the complementarity and synergies of all actions implemented so far by each beneficiary. The Green agenda for Western Balkans sets strategic objectives towards a clean transport that is a fit for a green and digital future, with sustainable mobility and a greening infrastructure as essential elements³⁶. In Serbia, the Ministry in charge of energy has started preparing the new Energy Development Strategy covering the period until 2050 but has also presented the preliminary goals for the National Energy and Climate plans (NECP). In addition, a Strategic environmental impact assessment procedure in EU and Western Balkans countries for the Interreg IPA Cross-border Cooperation (CBC) has been initiated in 2021 for the period 2021-2027. Environmental issues are also present in the EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR)³⁷, more specifically under Pillar 3 and within the Danube Strategy (EUSDR)³⁸. These two macro-regional Strategies provides a good opportunity for regional cooperation between Western Balkans countries and between EU Member States and Western Balkans countries. Inter pillar projects have been developed within EUSAIR to promote common projects in Environment and Transport but more synergies between the two macro-regional Strategies could be developed.

The process of European integration impact also on environmental issues in Western Balkans through European projects and negotiation of the Acquis

35 <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/default/files/economic-and-investment-plan-brochure.pdf>

36 Strategy for Sustainable and Smart Mobility in the Western Balkans, July 2021

37 <https://www.aii-ps.org/eusair>

38 <https://danube-region.eu/about/>

Communautaire. It is also a leverage on definition of public policies and local governments. In this sense, the process of European integration participates to the environmental democracy. However, without a clear calendar for EU integration of Western Balkans countries, economic dependance from non-EU international actors can continue with reinforcement of the dependent capitalism with its negative effects on environment.

Policy recommendations :

- To support active consultation and participation of civil society organization in preparation and monitoring implementation of Plans and Strategies in all sectors, including Energy, Environment and Transport in all Western Balkans countries and to organize exchange of experiences between countries in these tasks.
- To strengthen the role of research and academic institutions in the decision-making process for elaboration and implementation of public policies in the environment sector in all Western Balkans countries and to promote academic and research regional cooperation.
- To reinforce synergies between the two macro-regional Strategies (EUSAIR and EUSDR) in the area of environment and to strengthen regional Cross border cooperation (CBC) in environment through IPA CBC programs and projects and other international donors.

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AUTHOR

Nebojsa Vukadinovic is Senior Lecturer at Sciences Po Paris (campus Dijon) and associate researcher at IRM – CMRP (University of Bordeaux). He is also Lecturer at INALCO (Paris). His research focuses on the European Integration of Western Balkans countries with special regards to relations between external and local actors in the region. His research focuses also on transformation of States and economic development of Western Balkans countries. He holds several MA-equivalent degrees : DEA in Economics from the EHESS (Paris) ; DEA in political science from Sciences Po (Paris), DEA of Philosophy from University Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne. He holds also a PhD at Sciences Po Paris.

Email : nebojsa.vukadinovic@sciencespo.fr

KEY WORDS

Environmental democracy, dependent capitalism, Western Balkans, European integration

EUROPA NOVA PROJECT MANAGER FOR WB2EU

Isabelle Négrier, Executive director of EuropaNova, isabelle.negrier@europanova.eu. +33622755548

EUROPANOVA

Publication of EuropaNova's Scientific Committee

**War in Ukraine : what are the consequences for the
state of opinion?**

**Authors : Guillaume KLOSSA (President of EuropaNova) and
Bruce STOCKES (director of global economic attitudes at Pew
Research Center, senior fellow du German Marshall fund)**

A Ukrainian victory over Russia is key for the future of democracy at a moment when democracy is challenged everywhere in the world. Ukraine has resisted until now thanks to the willingness of its people, the quality of its political, military, and societal leadership and to the decisive support of the EU, its member States, and the United States. This joint support remains indispensable. But it should not be taken for granted for the medium/long term. EU public opinions remain highly supportive of Ukraine, but that is far from being the case in America.

To ensure U.S. support in the long run, it is essential that the American public understands that contrary to the mainstream perception, the US is not the only one to support Ukraine and that Europeans share this burden for the sake of democracy and free world values. On the European side, if EU citizens are to go on supporting Ukraine, they must understand that there is no opposition between reinforcing NATO and more generally reinforcing EU strategic priorities, such as energy. It is key that Europeans take advantage of this war to develop a strong, autonomous defense manufacturing industry, an indispensable for Europeans regaining technological leadership, while maintaining jobs. Such autonomy can also overcome the false perception that Europe is a vassal to the US, a perception which populist and nationalistic movements weaponize.

Before the war began, there was widespread concern that publics in both Europe and the United States would rapidly lose support for Ukraine in the wake of rising energy prices and slowing economies. To date, that has not happened. But the share of Americans who say the United States is doing too much for Ukraine has nearly quadrupled, from 7% to 26%. And the portion that believe Washington has not done enough has halved, from 49% to 17%. Sentiment about Ukraine support has become increasingly partisan. In March 2022, 9% of Republicans and 5% of Democrats said the U.S. was doing too much for Ukraine. By January 2023, 40% of Republicans, but just 15% of Democrats complained Washington was doing too much.

This erosion of Americans' support for Ukraine reflects a declining willingness to endure economic hardship if necessary. Less than half (48%) of the public in November, compared to 58% in July, believed that Washington should support Ukraine for as long as it takes, even if it means American households have to pay higher gas and food prices as a consequence. A similar share, 47%—up from 38% in July—said the United States should urge Ukraine to settle for peace as soon as possible so the costs aren't so great for American households, even if that means Ukraine will lose some territory. The largely partisan decline in Americans' support for continuing aid to Ukraine may, in part, be driven by growing wariness of Kyiv. A bare majority of Americans (52%) express approval of Ukraine in a survey conducted in the first six weeks of 2023. This reflects a 19-percentage point decline in a year.

And there has been a similar erosion of positive sentiment toward Ukraine in much of Europe. In France, just 34% have a favorable opinion of Ukraine, down 19 points since a year ago. In Germany, 39% hold a positive view, down 28 points. (42% of the French and 43% of Germans express disapproval of Ukraine.) Approval is also down 23 points in Italy and 12 points in the United Kingdom.

A new survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations offers both hope and a cautionary conclusion. A plurality (38%) of the public in nine European countries believe that Ukraine needs to regain all of its territory, even if it means a longer war. A third (34%) of Americans share that view. Only 30% of Europeans and 21% of Americans say the conflict between Russia and Ukraine needs to stop as soon as possible, even if it means Ukraine giving control of areas to Russia. Notably, however, there is no majority support on either side of the Atlantic for a prolonged war.

However, the latest Eurobarometer (February 2023) shows wide European support to go on backing Ukraine. Nine-in-ten (91%) of those surveyed approved of humanitarian help and more than three-quarters approved of the massive financial support granted to Ukraine. After one year of fighting, 56% of the citizens of the European Union approved of the EU reaction to the Russian attack on Ukraine in spite of the massive costs for the EU and its citizens, in particular rising energy costs and ensuing inflation. Putin bet that the war would divide the Europeans and would enrage European public opinion against the EU. His bet is lost, for the moment. European publics have rallied around more European policies in support of security, defense and the energy transition and group purchasing of energy. Indeed 77% of EU citizens now back a strong European defense and security policy and 82% support coordinated EU military procurement.

Vladimir Putin has been counting on an erosion of Western public support for Ukraine to ultimately deliver a victory he has not been able to achieve on the battlefield. The allies must not let this happen. But democracies on both sides of the Atlantic will also disregard at their peril public worries about a costly, forever Ukraine war. Policy makers seen as ignoring their citizens' views risk feeding the anti-establishment, anti-elitist narrative weaponized by right-wing populists and those on the left and the right who admire Putin's authoritarianism. Further erosion of public faith in the responsiveness of their elected leaders could have long-term corrosive consequences for both American and European democracy.

With so much at stake in both Ukraine and Western democracies, it is imperative that the Ukraine war be brought to a swift, victorious conclusion. This requires accelerated military support for Kyiv. Much will depend on the trajectory of the war over the next few months. If Ukraine is perceived as prevailing, European and American public opinion is likely to firm up. If Russia is seen as succeeding, the decline in support for Ukraine could accelerate.

Morally, the Ukrainians have the right to determine their own fate. Practically, regaining all of their lost territory is not achievable without fulsome Western support. And this duality poses challenges for European and American leaders. In conjunction with even greater military backing for Kyiv, it is time for frank, private discussions with the Ukrainian government about the necessary limitations on their objectives in light of waning Western public backing for the war effort. Such honest exchanges might include assurances of a post-war Western security guarantee short of immediate NATO membership, accelerated EU membership, and a united G7 commitment of public risk sharing to back massive private investment to rebuild post-war Ukraine.

After a year of war, American and European public support for Ukraine is much stronger than many feared on the eve of the conflict. But signs that backing is slowly eroding are indisputable in the US in particular. It is neither in Ukraine's nor in the allies' interest to wait until public opinion forces changes in the West's assistance for Kyiv. An immediate increase in military support for Ukraine should be accompanied by behind-the-scenes diplomacy on realistic expectations of the end game.

EUROPANOVA

Publication of EuropaNova's Scientific Committee

Europe, Tech and War

Author : Olivier COSTE, EuropaNova Fellow, author and expert in the «Tech» sector


Coordination : Isabelle NÉGRIER

In November 2022, Europeans discovered, with ChatGPT, that artificial intelligence (AI) could enable them to converse as pleasantly with a computer as with a friend. Their children can now do their literature homework in 3 minutes. Computer scientists can have quality code developed by machines. Music bands compete with original AI creations. The best minds are concerned about the political, moral and even existential risks to humanity of this innovation. Although still imperfect, this technology will make exponential progress in the months to come, penetrating all fields of the economy and our activities. In short, we are witnessing the rapid realization of an industrial revolution on the same scale as the advent of the motor, electricity or nuclear fission.


Unlike previous industrial revolutions, this one is not taking place in Europe, but in the USA and China. For the first time since 1450 and the invention of printing, Europe is out of the innovation game. The only AI players are American and Chinese. Not a single European player, private or public, has mastered these new technologies. Europeans are in much the same situation as the Chinese or Indians of 1840, proud of their thousand-year-old civilizations, who saw the Europeans arrive with steamships and cannons.

Europe's lag in Tech is well known: «no European Google, no French Steve Jobs», journalists lament. But the extent of the lag is not understood: «we have Dassault Systèmes in France, SAP in Germany, Ericsson in Sweden, and French Tech is producing promising unicorns!» we hear. So you have to give the figures, show the curves, cite your sources and justify your statements. This was the first subject of my research, then of my book «L'Europe, la Tech et la Guerre».

Here's a quick summary: every year, American companies invest \$240 billion in research and development (R&D) in the tech sector; European companies invest around \$50 billion, i.e. 5 times less; Chinese companies, which started from nothing in 2000, have already reached \$80 billion and are growing by 15% a year.



Furthermore, this European weakness is new: Germany accounted for 8% of global R&D in Tech in 2005, and has now dropped to less than 2%. France was at 6%, and has also fallen to 2%. The UK, Italy and Spain are in similar or worse situations. The European collapse is general and relatively recent.



Will French Tech save us? Every year, American startups raise 3 times more capital than European startups, and 30 times more than French startups. French unicorns account for less than 2% of global unicorn valuations. Nothing better in Germany. It's hard to base any solid hope of renewal on these figures.

All these figures are public and official. Reports have been piling up, sounding the alarm for years. Governments announce ambitious plans to reassure public opinion. But faced with the astronomical amounts invested by the American and Chinese giants, discouragement prevails. Apple makes 100 billion a year in profits, twice the French defense budget. Google invests over 30 billion a year in R&D, almost as much as all French companies put together, all sectors combined (Renault + Airbus + L'Oreal + Dassault +... = 35 billion). Each of the GAFAMs «weighs» as much as France.

When confronted with these figures, ministers and business leaders cite a number of reasons that have remained fairly constant over the past 30 years: an insufficient risk culture, the fragmentation of the European market, Brussels' competition policy, the absence of an industrial policy «à la Pompidou», the lack of long-term savings, fussy regulations, social charges and taxation... As these reasons seem unsolvable to them, political and economic leaders are clearly discouraged!

None of these reasons correspond to my experience in Tech. I spent 12 years working for major European Tech companies that «forbade» hiring in Europe, for reasons that are logical and unrelated to the previous hypotheses. This was the second objective of my research, and then of my book: what are the root causes of Europe's lag in Tech? How can we explain the fact that Europe, which was at the origin of all major technological innovations from 1450 to 1914, is now out of the running for the third industrial revolution?

To present my analysis convincingly, I had to document it carefully, spell out my reasoning, illustrate it with real-life examples from Matignon, Alcatel and startups - in short, write a book. But in just a few lines, it's best to start with an analogy. If you're given a car with no brake pedal, you'll drive very carefully. On a freeway, on a clear day with no traffic, you might speed a little, relying on the engine brake to slow you down. But if it's a winding mountain road with poor visibility and no brake pedal, you won't take the car.

Investing in innovation is like driving a car. You have to be able to brake to drive. Twentieth-century industries (automotive, energy, chemicals, etc.) have become mature and predictable, like a freeway on a clear day: investment is relatively low-risk, and engine braking is sufficient. Tech, on the other hand, is in the midst of an industrial revolution, volatile and unpredictable, like a mountain road in fog. Projects have a 10%, 20% or 30% chance of success. You have to brake hard and often. Without brakes, you risk an accident, so you don't take the road.

Yet, since 1975 - 1976, Europe has forbidden large companies to put on the brakes: in almost all European countries, national labor laws impose deadlines and costs in the event of failure that make risky investment absurd: you're sure to lose money. As a result, Europe has specialized and excelled in the industries invented between 1880 and 1920, which are now mature and predictable. The United States and China, which have kept their foot on the brake, have specialized in Tech and are leading the way. Far ahead.

Europe, which bans the brake pedal, is asking its Tech champions to race against American and Chinese competitors equipped with powerful brakes. Europe improves their engines (public research), optimizes their fuels (public subsidies, BPI) and is astonished by the failure of its champions. This analysis generally elicits two reactions: disbelief and despair. But I'm profoundly optimistic about Europe: if we tackle this issue, we can bring it back to the forefront of innovation. So we need to address both issues: disbelief first, despair second.


As for incredulity, I refer you first to my book, which devotes dozens of pages to real-life examples and the reasoning of investors, both industrial and financial, when faced with the launch of Tech projects in Europe. For those who don't have the patience for it, I'd simply like to unveil two figures that are little or poorly known: 200k euros and 20%.

Firstly, 200k euros is the total cost, per engineer, of restructuring in Europe for a major group. Laying off 10,000 people costs 2 billion euros in Europe, and almost nothing in the rest of the world. This figure is little-known, if at all, because the companies that lay people off don't brag about it; they keep these calculations to the secret of their boards of directors.


Secondly, 20% is the success rate of a project launched by a major Tech group, with enough maturity to be endowed with several million euros and announced publicly by the CEO, be it Jeff Bezos (Amazon) or Satya Nadella (Microsoft). Around 4 out of 5 projects fail. But then again, companies don't brag about it, because they write the story of their successes, rarely of their many failures.

The combination of these two little-known figures makes Tech investment structurally unprofitable in Europe: investors launching R&D projects in Europe are certain to lose money. This is a logical explanation for the very low level of tech investment in Europe, despite the fact that the continent remains the world leader in mature 20th century industries, where risk is much lower.

La spécialisation américaine : la Tech



La spécialisation européenne : 2^e révolution industrielle




For those who remain incredulous, I refer you to my book « L'Europe, la Tech et la Guerre », and move on to the second reaction, despair. Any reasonable person who witnessed the deep tensions over pension reform in France in the winter of 2023 is justified in considering that labor law reform is unthinkable. So far, I agree. But the reactions go further: leading political and economic figures, despite their conviction of the seriousness of the European situation, are giving up and believing that nothing can be done. Here, I disagree.

First of all, just because a problem is complicated doesn't mean it can't be solved. When the dollar broke away from gold in 1974, it caused a level of volatility in European currencies that made it necessary to create a European currency. It seemed impossible at the time. It took 15 years of preparation and the fall of the Berlin Wall before the decision was taken in 1992, despite the general hostility of the Germans. The euro entered our pockets in 2002. Europe is capable of far-reaching reform, given enough time.

Secondly, France is not Europe. All European countries have labor laws that are ill-suited to Tech, starting with Germany, where the situation is far worse than in France. Even the UK, with its Thatcherite image, imposes constraints on redundancies in large groups that penalize its tech sector. Yet hostility to reform, so acute in France in 2023, is not so strong in other European countries. Schroeder's unemployment insurance reforms in 2004 are a famous example. What's more, German, Italian, Dutch and Swedish industries are much more exposed to the Chinese market and the risk of technological dependence than in France. Pressures for reform will be more intense in these countries.

Finally, there's no question of calling into question the European social model. Its foundations are free education, free healthcare, unemployment insurance and pay-as-you-go pensions, most of which were adopted in 1936 or at the Liberation. None of this hinders innovation. There's no need to become American ultra-liberals to get back into Tech. The laws to be reformed date back to Giscard and Helmut Schmidt, after the «30 glorieuses», and were designed to protect the Billancourt workers from the mass unemployment resulting from the 1st oil shock.



Yet these laws are applied to highly qualified, well-paid tech engineers who have no trouble finding work. Is this really socially or politically legitimate? Are the French going to march to the Place de la République to defend the job protection of computer developers paid 8,000 euros a month who can find work in 2 weeks?

We need to find reforms that eliminate the cost of failed investment in Tech without jeopardizing the protection of low-skilled, poorly-paid people facing a difficult employment situation. The Danish flexicurity model would be highly appropriate: it's very European and perfect for Tech. Another idea would be to remove the constraints on restructuring by large groups for employees paid above a certain threshold, say 4,000 or 5,000 euros gross per month. Other avenues are also conceivable.

Finally, we need to convince public opinion of the desirability of these reforms. We need to take the time to forge a consensus from the Rassemblement National to the Left, because the tech industry will not invest the hundreds of billions needed in our country if there is a risk of legislative change during a political changeover. This requires a great deal of work by think tanks, research laboratories and opinion leaders who analyze the subject, produce reports and prepare minds. This will take years. But we must start now. And it's unacceptable to give up: it's the responsibility of our generation to start the process.

Révolutions Industrielles et Guerres

1ère Révolution Industrielle

Machine à vapeur

1800



Première guerre de l'opium

1839 – 1842

*Bateaux à vapeur contre
jonques*

2ème Révolution Industrielle

Moteur à explosion

1900



Deuxième guerre mondiale

1939 - 1945

Avions, chars, porte-avions

3ème Révolution Industrielle

Semi-conducteur

1960



Ukraine

2022

*Missiles de précision contre
chars et avions*

The stakes are historical. Europeans colonized America and India because they had better technologies. Eighteenth-century China refused to integrate new European technologies, was then militarily crushed by European steamships in 1842 and 1860, flooded with opium by the British, experienced civil war and Japanese massacres, and then the horrors of Mao. The Europe of 2023 faces a similar choice in the face of Tech developments. The war in Ukraine is being fought using American technologies. The Cold War has begun between China and the US over technology. If it turns into a hot war, it will be fought on weapons equipped with semiconductors and artificial intelligence. If Europe wants peace, it must prepare for war, and that means Tech.

EUROPANOVA

Publication of EuropaNova's Scientific Committee

Higher education and democratization in Western Balkans: challenges for integration into European Union and global economy

Author: Marc NEBOJSA VUKADINOVIC

Coordination: Isabelle NÉGRIER

Introduction

Western Balkans countries have experienced profound transformations over the past three decades: exit/ transition from communism to a market economy, appearance of new states, conflicts of the 1990s in the former Yugoslav area, migrations, process of joining the European Union. In this context, education systems have also undergone transformations. This raises the question of the relationship between higher education and the process of democratization. As such, the main research work is based above all on the relationship between higher education, citizenship and participation in civil society (Nie, Junn and StehlikBarr, 1996)¹. In addition, other researchers have analyzed the relationship between education levels and voting (Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos 2004)². Higher education has also been studied in terms of its contribution to political activism (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2009)³. Some researchers have analyzed the transformations of education systems and higher education in the Western Balkans in the context of integration into the European Union (M. Vukasovic 2012)⁴. Based on this research and fieldwork, the aim of this article is to raise the following questions: What role can higher education play in the democratization of the Western Balkans? How have higher education systems changed in the context of the exit from communism towards capitalism? Did the 1990s leave its mark on higher education systems? How can higher education contribute to transmitting European values? How does higher education contribute to the integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union and into the global economy?

Post-communist legacy and transformations of political and economic systems. What are the consequences for higher education in the Western Balkans?

Following the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia since the 1990s, the higher education system has undergone profound transformations. Firstly, the education systems have undergone profound changes following the arrival of new

1 Norman H. NIE, June JUNN and Kenneth STEHLIK-BARRY Education and Democratic Citizenship in America, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1996

2 Kevin MILLIGAN, Enrico MORETTI, Philip OREOPOULOS, Does education improve citizenship? Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom, *Journal of Public Economics*, vol.88, 2004, pp.1667-1695

3 Nancy BURNS, Kac LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, Sidney VERBA, *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*, Harvard University Press, 2009, 471 p.

4 Martina VUKASOVIC, European integration in higher education in the Western Balkan countries (WBC) A Review of Literature, Norglobal programme, 2012

political parties resulting from the first “free” elections in the early 1990s. Each state in the Western Balkans has its particularities. Thus, Croatia and Serbia are the countries with the oldest tradition of higher education. The other countries have more recent higher education systems. The decade of the 1990s was a period of rising nationalisms and economic collapse. During this decade there was also a collapse of values, a significant increase in the informal economy and an increase in corruption in all spheres of society, including higher education. It was also a period with winners and losers from the post-communist transition with wars. It is in this context that private higher education institutions have appeared. In addition, during this decade the migrations of young people to Western countries were significant. Most of the private higher education institutions created during this decade have survived. Others were created in the 2000s. Some of these institutions have been the subject of criticism in the media of the Western Balkans countries ⁵ regarding the quality of studies, corruption, and the purchase of diplomas. Some public higher education institutions have also been the subject of criticism and cases exposed in the media. The number of students in private universities remains very high. The question of financing studies in private higher education is a real problem for many families. In addition, even in public universities, there are two categories of students: those on State budget and other self-financing. It thus appears for example that one out of two students must finance their studies in Serbia with very high amounts in a country where monthly average salaries are low and the cost of living high. In this context, students who can benefit from State support are thus largely privileged.

The Bologna process and the reforms of higher education systems in the Western Balkans

Most of the Western Balkans countries have implemented reforms related to the Bologna process since 2003, so only a few years after the 29 Bologna signatories have agreed to support the general principles of the « Sorbonne declaration ». In this context, Western Balkans countries could participate to the European Higher Education Area (EHEA)⁶. For example, Serbia joined the Bologna process in 2003 and has adopted new legislation. The adoption of the higher education law supporting the implementation of the Bologna process followed in 2005. The reform process continued with the adoption of standards for accreditation, self-assessment, and external quality control in 2006. This set the conditions for the start of the accreditation process for higher education institutions and study programs in 2007⁷. This laid down the framework that is still in effect.

5 <https://www.ekspres.net/srbija/sporne-doktorske-diplome-predmet-pravne-ekspertize-provera-oko-100-doktorata>.

6 ZGAGA, Pavel, Reconsidering the EHEA Principles: Is There a 'Bologna Philosophy'? In A. Curaj, P.Scott, L. Vlasceanu & L. Wilson (Eds.), *European Higher Education at the Crossroads: Between the Bologna Process and National Reforms* (pp. 17-38). 2012 Dordrecht: Springer.

7 <https://eurydice.eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-education-systems/serbia/higher-education>

It is only after 2012, that is to say after obtaining the status of candidate country for membership of the European Union, that Serbia could benefit from other European funds alongside the pre-funds. - IPA membership (IPA I, IPA II and currently IPA III). Among these funds is the European research support program Horizon Europe. In Montenegro, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania, higher education reforms linked to the Bologna process also took place in the early 2000s. Bologna was also followed by a modernization and internationalization of higher education. Standards and guidelines for quality assurance were adopted in all Western Balkans countries. Since their adoption, significant progress has been made in ensuring the quality of higher education and other action lines of the Bologna Process, such as the development of the qualification's framework, the recognition of qualifications and the development of learning outcomes.

European Union integration and higher education: a lever for democratisation?

The processes of integration into the European Union have repercussions on the educational systems of higher education but also represent opportunities for higher education and research institutions in the Western Balkan States⁸. The reforms have repercussions on different levels⁹, for institutions and organizations but also for students, teachers and researchers and people employed in higher education and research. In most of Western Balkans countries, these changes have created new opportunities. However, there is still a lack of utilization of possibilities in terms of accession to EU funds for Higher education and Research. Even if it is possible for higher education institutions from Western Balkans countries to the Horizon Europe program, to Erasmus plus and other programs, there is a significant lack of capacity in project development and preparation even if there are some success stories¹⁰. In addition, economic situations in the Western Balkans are also lower than those in the EU member States. In this context, the socio-economic background and environment for students and researchers in Western Balkans is not favorable and they are disadvantaged in comparison with students in EU members countries¹¹.

8 <http://www.nsinitiative.uns.ac.rs/index.html> (consulted on June 20th 2023)

9 Harry de BOER, Jon FILE, Marco SEEBER, Martina VUKASOVIC, Don F.WESTERHEIJDEN, Policy Analysis of Structural Reforms in Higher Education, Processes and Outcomes, Palgrave, Macmillan, 2017.

10 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-2020-2024/europe-world/international-cooperation/serbia_en (Consulted on 12th June 2023)

11 See the PISA assesment (PISA is the OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment). Results shows that a student's socio-economic background is represented through the index of economic, social and cultural status (ESCS), which is created based upon information about a student's home environment, parents' level of education and parents' employment. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/764847ff-en/1/3/1/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/764847ff-en&_csp_=-c8a6d28bf137221d8a45ab2b8d91930e&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book#section-d1e850 https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/764847ff-en/1/3/1/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/764847ff-en&_csp_=-c8a6d28bf137221d8a45ab2b8d91930e&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book#section-d1e850 (Consulted on 12 th June 2023)

In this context, investments in knowledge economy¹² can benefit to all socio-economic spheres. In this sense, the creation of Horizon Europe Joint Committees¹³ with Western Balkans countries can be very useful. They can contribute to strengthen and promote Research and Innovation through cooperation and integration in the new European Research Area (ERA)¹⁴. The European Union support also development of science and innovation development parks. Some of them are financed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)¹⁵. These initiatives can contribute to strengthen linkages between universities, research centers and the private sector. Having in mind the importance of new technologies and innovation for the economic development, these initiatives can also foster the employment of young researchers. Mobility of students and researcher from Western Balkans countries is already supported by the European Union and bilateral funds. Through this mobility, new idea, new concepts, new thoughts can be exchanged, and they can contribute to democratisation. In the past, the « intelligentsia » from Western Balkans had the opportunity to study in Vienna, München, Paris, London and other Western European cities. This was crucial to build the legislative frameworks, to transfer knowledge in many fields. Nowadays, challenges are similar and higher education and research activities can play a crucial role in the democratisation and development of the region.

What role for doctoral studies in Western Balkans?

In the field of doctoral studies and research, several initiatives have emerged over the past twenty years. Thus, launched by NGOs (think-tanks), the idea of creating a Research Center for South-Eastern Europe was taken up by the University of York through the creation of an independent associative structure based in Thessaloniki in 2003. The idea of creating a regional platform for the development of cooperation in higher education and research also came from civil society and was promoted by think-tanks. The idea was taken up by the University of Zagreb, which launched a cooperation platform “Regional Platform for Benchmarking and Cooperation in Higher Education and Research” in which several Western Balkan countries participate. This platform aims to improve the quality of studies in universities. However, few concrete results have emerged despite this interesting initiative. In 2016, the idea of creating a fund for research in the Western Balkans (Western Balkan Research Fund) was also launched, which has not yet seen the light of day. In addition to the IPA pre-accession funds, the Western Balkan countries can participate in European projects in the field of research.

12 S. HANCOCK, A future in the knowledge economy? Analysing the career strategies of doctoral scientists through the principles of game theory. Higher Education, 2018

13 The first Serbia-Horizon Europe Joint Committee has been organised on June 15th 2023 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-2020-2024/europe-world/international-cooperation/serbia_en

14 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-2020-2024/our-digital-future/european-research-area_en#commissions-plan-for-a-new-era-based-on-excellence (Consulted on 29th June 2023)

15 <https://www.ebrd.com/news/2023/serbia-to-build-science-and-technology-parks-with-80-million-ebrd-loan.html> (Consuulted on July 7th)

However, the number of projects submitted to Horizon and other programs remains low. Furthermore, research networks between the Western Balkan states remain weak and very few partnership projects are presented for European funding. Despite the existence of cross-border cooperation projects within the framework of the pre-accession funds (IPA) which are currently in the third phase IPA III (2021-2027), these projects do not cover the academic field and rare are the projects that associate research centers or universities with the private sector for innovation projects. On the other hand, cross-border cooperation projects such as the Danube Strategy or the Ionian Adriatic Strategy, which bring together Member States of the European Union and the Western Balkan States and have for some years included research centers in certain fields (environment, transport, cultural heritage) remain at this stage initiatives that do not integrate the question of the training of future researchers. All life learning is crucial for a researcher career¹⁶. In this sense, in parallel to their research, young researchers should learn how to build their career and how to develop a « scientific project-oriented culture ». This goal is not easy and requires investments in capacity buildings of individual researchers, higher education instructions and research centers.

French experience in the field of doctoral studies and the Western Balkans

Doctoral studies in the Western Balkans deserve to be better structured and doctoral students during their doctoral career should be able to benefit from a supervised and reasoned doctoral training program. In this area, France has experienced a very clear development of its doctoral schools in recent years through an enriched training system and reinforced support for doctoral studies. Thus, since the decree of 25 May 2016 setting the national training framework and the procedures leading to the award of the national doctoral diploma, doctoral students benefit from training and professional research experience which leads to the production of new knowledge. A training agreement is drawn up for each doctoral student. Doctoral training includes personal research work carried out by the doctoral student, supplemented by compulsory additional training validated by the doctoral school. It covers work of scientific, economic, social, technological, or cultural interest. Since the certification of the doctorate, defining the skills of doctoral graduates and registering the doctorate in the national directory of professional certification, the issuance of the doctorate certifies the ability to produce new high-level scientific knowledge as well as the acquisition and mastery of 6 blocks of skills common to all doctors and linked to their training through research. With the aim of promoting the recruitment of doctors by employers in the production and service sectors, these blocks of skills are defined by decree. In addition to cross-cutting seminars on disciplinary and areal themes and thematic schools organized by research teams, there are doctoral training workshops, intensive training courses in research methodology and tools, (generic cross-training scientific English, editorial know-how, development of scientific presentation in the form of a slide show, use of bibliographic management software,

16 L. AUROIL, L., M/ MISU. and R.A. FREEMAN,, Careers of doctoral holders: analysis of labour market and mobility indicators. OECD Science, Technology and Industry working papers, 2013.

introduction to digital identity and social networks for young researchers, optimization of research and monitoring, presentation of electronic resources in open access, raise awareness of the risks of plagiarism, research ethics, etc.), as well as the seminars which will have to cover the items of the several blocks of skills. Individual doctoral student monitoring committees, from the second year of the doctorate, also evaluate the progress of the doctoral students' work. Concerning Western Balkans countries, France has launched in 2021 the program ES-Balk supported by FEI (France Education International)¹⁷ to support innovative projects in higher education in Western Balkans. Within this program a project for the creation of a regional doctoral school for Western Balkans¹⁸ has been implemented as well as other projects. The French interest to invest in higher education and research in Western Balkans follow other initiatives towards research, innovation, and development.

Support to higher education and research in Western Balkans countries is still needed in order to help building the future of students and young researchers. The mobility of students and researchers is also crucial to transfer knowledge with other countries. This mobility with the Western Balkans region is also important for reconciliation. The question of independence of research activity is also crucial for the democratisation of the region.

17 <https://www.france-education-international.fr/document/aapes-balkvf> (Consulted in April 2021)

18 <https://edbalk.eu/>

Policy Recommendations :

1. Monitoring and evaluation of mechanisms of higher education and Research in Western Balkans countries should be developed in accordance with EU best practices.
2. Capacities of higher education institutions and research centers as well as individual researchers in Western Balkans countries to apply to EU funds should be strengthened through specific EU and bilateral projects. In this sense, international aid towards Western Balkans should allocate more funds for capacity building projects in higher education and research.
3. Links between higher education institutions, research centers and private sector as well as with civil society in Western Balkans countries should be developed in order to promote research and innovative approaches to development and employability of students after their studies.

Abstract

Higher education and research activities in Western Balkans countries started to be in the focus of interests of the EU recently even if access to EU funds for higher education and research is possible since a few years. The article analyses the role of higher education and research in the context of EU integration of Western Balkans countries. Many reforms of higher education systems have been implemented since the integration of Western Balkans countries in the Bologna Process. However, many efforts are still needed to strengthen their higher education and research sector in the Western Balkans.

About the author

Marc Nebojsa Vukadinovic is a senior lecturer at Sciences Po Paris (campus Dijon) and an associate researcher at IRM-CMRP (University of Bordeaux). He is also a lecturer at INALCO (Paris).

His research focuses on the European integration of Western Balkan countries with special regards to relations between external and local actors in the region. His research also focuses on the transformation of states and the economic development of Western Balkan countries.

He holds several MA-equivalent degrees: DEA in Economics from the EHESS (Paris); DEA in Political Science from Sciences Po (Paris); and DEA of Philosophy from the University of Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne. He also holds a PhD from Sciences Po Paris. He is member of the Scientific Committee of EuropaNova.

EUROPANOVA

Publication of EuropaNova's Scientific Committee

Should this year's COP28 be the last?

Authors: Marc NEBOJSA VUKADINOVIC, Isabelle NÉGRIER

Different, more flexible and more regional summits and organisations must emerge to collectively achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, Dr Marc Nebojsa Vukadinovic and Isabelle Négrier write. Every year since 1995, the Conference of the Parties, or COP, has brought together the member states of the United Nations to discuss climate issues. And in 2015, during COP21, the Paris Agreement marked a turning point in the fight against global warming. For the first time, all of the United Nations member states committed to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions, with the ambitious goal of keeping global warming below 2°C by 2100.

It was no longer a question of debates, observations or declarations of intent, but a real commitment, with figures, made in front of the whole world, for observers and future generations to see. It was also a great success for European and French diplomacy, which managed to get the world's most polluting nations to sign up for the agreement. Yet, here we are. But eight years have passed. Successive COPs have made little meaningful progress, and most of the progress in the fight against global warming is now being organised elsewhere, in other institutions, at other events, in bilateral relations between states, or simply under pressure from public opinion. The framework set by governments is blatantly clear: it is up to them to implement it, and it is up to businesses to rise to the challenge. The model ... may have been effective in 2015, but it is now showing its limits: no global agreement has been signed since.

Meanwhile, COP became emblematic of a format of major diplomatic symposia that have run out of steam, and its inherent limitations are about to be demonstrated by the upcoming event in the United Arab Emirates. The model — bringing together all the world's nations, which is inherently laborious and complex — may have been effective in 2015, but it is now showing its limits: no global agreement has been signed since. Worse still, the COP model now appears to be counterproductive, gradually becoming the symbol of a grand diplomatic rave against a backdrop of greenwashing. COP28, to be held in Dubai in November and December, is the most caricatured example of this.

[Emirates as organisers, Emirates as polluters](#)

It will be difficult to convince European, Asian, African or American public opinion to opt for a more sober growth model coming from the United Arab Emirates. The small Gulf petro-monarchy, with a population of just ten million, is the sixth largest per capita emitter of CO₂ in the world, at 22 tonnes per person per year. The UAE is also the world's seventh-largest oil producer, producing and exporting nearly 4,000 barrels a day.

It is difficult to give one's blessing to an event dedicated to the fight against global warming organised by one of the world's biggest polluters and, to add insult to injury, chaired by one of the country's biggest polluters, Sultan Al-Jaber, who is both President of COP28 and CEO of ADNOC, the national oil company of the UAE.

In an open letter to world leaders and the UN on 23 May, hundreds of European and US parliamentarians called for the withdrawal of Sultan Al-Jaber as president of COP28, yet to no avail.

Turning an ecological aberration into a historic opportunity

Under these conditions, and in order to avoid fuelling future diplomatic and ecological disillusionment, we urgently need to move on. It's time to opt for new political models to advance the fight against global warming and break our dependence on fossil fuels. Different, more flexible and more regional summits and organisations must emerge to collectively achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. Let's help the states, companies and NGOs of the five continents to set up new forms of organisation, adapted to their regional realities and genuinely effective in achieving our climate objectives.

Europe was in the driving seat in 2015, helping COP21 to deliver a framework to structure our climate goals for the coming century. From this point onward, French and European diplomacy must continue to assume their responsibilities by promoting the emergence of new institutions that will eventually replace the repeated COP agreements, which combine meaninglessness with impotence.

Let's not give our blessing to this COP28, which will discredit the fight against global warming. On the contrary, let's help the states, companies and NGOs of the five continents to set up new forms of organisation, adapted to their regional realities and genuinely effective in achieving our climate objectives. Europe has the opportunity to show its difference, to demonstrate its values and to make its citizens proud. Let's make history and serve the planet.

EUROPANOVA

Publication of EuropaNova's Scientific Committee

The Right to Privacy and the State's Duty to Protect Life
in the European Court of Human Rights' Jurisprudence
on Medically-Assisted Termination of Life.

Author: Victor GOUT

Coordination : Isabelle NÉGRIER

*“Romeo: Hold, there is forty ducats. Let me have
A dram of poison, such soon-speeding gear
As will disperse itself through all the veins
That the life-weary taker may fall dead,
And that the trunk may be discharged of breath
As violently as hasty powder fired
Doth hurry from the fatal cannon’s womb.
Apothecary: Such mortal drugs I have, but Mantua’s law
Is death to any he that utters them.”*

William Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, Act V, Sc.1

Medically-Assisted Termination of Life (MATL) in European Human Rights Law

In Shakespeare’s *Romeo and Juliet*, this pivotal scene unfolds when Romeo mistakenly believes that his beloved Juliet has perished. Despairing at the prospect of a life devoid of her presence, he resolves to join her in death. Pursuing this tragic end, he approaches the Apothecary, a medical practitioner of the era, and asks him to supply a potent poison. The Apothecary, however, is beset by a dilemma, as it is illegal in Mantua for a physician to assist someone in terminating¹ their life.

1. Legal Aspects Over Medical Ethics

The Apothecary’s conundrum draws attention to the intricate matter of regulating physician involvement in termination-of-life decision-making. While some may seek guidance from medical ethics, such as the Hippocratic Oath², which explicitly prohibits doctors from providing lethal substances upon request, the Apothecary in this case defers to Mantua’s legal framework rather than ethical considerations. In fact, studies by Hinkka et al. indicate that physicians, like the Apothecary, rather than relying on principles of medical ethics, often base their decisions on the extent to which the law accommodates their personal moral beliefs when confronted with termination-of-life dilemmas³. This observation raises concerns about the effectiveness of medical ethics in regulating physician involvement in termination-of-life matters. Furthermore, Miller et al. discovered that although ethical debates can offer valuable insights into patient care, discussions surrounding termination-of-life situations tend to resemble impassioned moral disagreements about the subjective value assigned to life, rather than objective deliberation⁴. Bruns and Chelouche, therefore, argue that it is not the duty of doctors or medical ethics to resolve such moral debates within a democratic so-

1 Throughout this thesis, the term “termination of life” describes a specific set of circumstances in which an individual’s life is intentionally and actively brought to an end rather than allowed to reach its ‘natural’ end due to an underlying condition.

2 Hippocrates, “The Hippocratic Oath” (U.S. National Library of Medicine, 275AD), https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html.

3 H. Hinkka et al., “Factors Affecting Physicians’ Decisions to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatments in Terminal Care,” *Journal of Medical Ethics* 28, no. 2 (April 1, 2002): 109–14, <https://doi.org/10.1136/jme.28.2.109>.

4 Franklin G. Miller, Robert D. Truog, and Dan W. Brock, “Moral Fictions and Medical Ethics,” *Bioethics* 24, no. 9 (November 2010): 453–60, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01738.x>.

ciety⁵. Instead, they propose that elected representatives, rather than medical professionals, should tackle these issues through legislative processes. With this in mind, this thesis invites the reader to set aside moral considerations and concentrate on the legal framework as the sole means of reconciling moral positions in a democratic setting. This approach emphasizes the importance of law in addressing the complex and emotionally charged nature of termination-of-life decision-making.

2. The State's Duty to Protect Life

To regulate the role of the physician in termination of life matters, the lawmaker must first recognize the fundamental duty of the State to protect the lives of its citizens, a principle deeply ingrained in social contract theory⁶ and enshrined as a fundamental principle of international law in Article 3 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*⁷. In the context of regulating a physician's role in termination-of-life situations, lawmakers need to recognize that this State's duty to protect life becomes even more critical when the safety of citizens is jeopardized not by their own actions but by the consequences of communal living. Emile Durkheim, the French sociologist who laid the foundations of the discipline, proposed the concept of "normal social facts"⁸ to emphasize that certain social phenomena consistently emerge as a result of societal interactions rather than being solely based on individual choices. When these normal social facts threaten citizens' lives, it becomes the State's responsibility to take action and protect its citizens' lives. Durkheim specifically demonstrated that suicide is an example of such a normal social fact. This perspective implies that various social conditions, including social integration and regulation, have a considerable influence on an individual's decision to terminate their life. It is, therefore, crucial to examine the ways in which physicians' actions in termination-of-life decision-making may intersect with these social factors. Physicians who facilitate the termination of a patient's life could be seen as contributing to a broader social problem, potentially exacerbating existing social conditions that encourage suicide. Given that the State is responsible for preserving life, it may then feel compelled to impose criminal penalties on physicians who assist individuals in terminating their lives.

3. End-of-Life as a Private Matter

In the contemporary European context, lawmakers must also acknowledge that a cultural and social shift in attitudes towards death challenged the involvement of the State in end-of-life matters.

As noted by French historian Philippe Ariès in 1977, "death is now so erased

5 Florian Bruns and Tessa Chelouche, "Lectures on Inhumanity: Teaching Medical Ethics in German Medical Schools Under Nazism," *Annals of Internal Medicine* 166, no. 8 (April 18, 2017): 591–95, <https://doi.org/10.7326/M16-2758>.

6 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

7 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," Pub. L. No. Res. 217 A (III), UDHR (1948), <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.htm>.

8 Emile Durkheim, *Le Suicide* (Quebec: Les Classiques des Sciences Sociales, 1897).

from [European] customs that [Europeans] have difficulty imagining and understanding it. The old attitude where death is both close, familiar and diminished, insensitive, is too much in contrast to ours where it is so frightening that we no longer dare to say its name”⁹. Tony Walter further explains that changing family structures, advances in medical technology, and the rise of secularism have all contributed to a shift in traditional rituals and practices surrounding the end-of-life towards a de-socialization of this last phase of life¹⁰. This has led to the end-of-life becoming a private matter rather than a communal or public experience.

In the juridical and political sphere, Michel Foucault argued that “it could be said that the old right to make people die or to let them live has been replaced by a power to make people live or to reject them in death. This is perhaps the explanation for the disqualification of death that is marked by the recent disuse of the rituals that accompanied it”¹¹. In other words, Michel Foucault’s argument is that in the past, the power of the sovereign was manifested in the right to take the lives of individuals or to spare them¹². However, in modern times, this power has transformed into a power to control and manage populations through various techniques of power. This power determines who can live and who will die, not by direct violence but through the regulation of social and biological processes.

Additionally, the change in the legal status of suicide and attempted suicide during the 19th and 20th centuries highlights the ‘privatization’ of end-of-life matters. As researchers Prakash B. Behere, T. S. Sathyanarayana Rao, and Akshata N. Mulmule¹³ have shown, religious beliefs played a significant role in shaping the State’s views toward suicide. Suicide was often seen as an act of rebellion against the State’s authority and control over an individual’s life, as well as a transgression against religious principles. Consequently, the State condemned suicide as a means of evading its earthly authority and viewed it as an act of disobedience that threatened its power. However, with the growing opinion that decisions regarding one’s body belong to the sphere of private life and should be respected, there has been a change in the State’s stance towards decriminalization.

This shift in attitudes towards death has been further reinforced by the significant increase in average European life expectancy. Since 1950, the average European life expectancy has risen by a remarkable 17 years, reaching 79 years as of 2021¹⁴. The law shall, therefore, take into account that the proportion of the overall population aged 65 and older is anticipated to grow from 20% in 2019 to 30% in 2050¹⁵. An increasing number of individuals now face the harsh reality of living with incurable or terminal illnesses, the effects of which can only be mitigated or delayed

9 Philippe Ariès, *L’Homme Devant La Mort, Histoire* (Paris: Seuil, 1985).

10 Tony Walter, *Death in the Modern World* (New York: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2020).

11 Michel Foucault, *Histoire de La Sexualité. Tome 1. La Volonté de Savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976).

12 Council of Europe, “The ECHR and the Death Penalty: A Timeline,” accessed April 8, 2023, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/death-penalty>.

13 Prakash B. Behere, T. S. Sathyanarayana Rao, and Akshata N. Mulmule, “Decriminalization of Attempted Suicide Law: Journey of Fifteen Decades,” *Indian Journal of Psychiatry* 57, no. 2 (2015): 122–24, <https://doi.org/10.4103/0019-5545.158131>.

14 Population Division, “World Population Prospects” (United Nations, 2022), <https://population.un.org/wpp/>.

15 Eurostat, “Ageing Europe - Statistics on Population Developments,” 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Ageing_Europe_statistics_on_population_developments#Older_people_.E2.80.94_population_overview.

by medicine. In many cases, the relentless progression of these conditions results in debilitating pain and a profound deterioration in the quality of life. This overwhelming suffering leaves some individuals feeling trapped in a cycle of anguish, leading them to believe that their pain is too unbearable to endure any longer. This belief has led to the incorporation of respecting a patient's refusal of life-prolonging medical treatments into normal medical practices¹⁶. As a consequence, there has also been a marked rise in the number of people seeking the option to terminate their lives through physician-assisted-suicide or euthanasia¹⁷.

4. The Legal Debate on MATL

Assisted-suicide and euthanasia are two distinct medical practices that involve the termination of a patient's life. In assisted-suicide, a physician supplies a lethal medication that the patient then self-administers, while in euthanasia, the physician directly administers the lethal medication to the patient. Despite their differences, it is important to recognize the similarities between assisted-suicide and euthanasia. In most instances, the progression leading up to the ultimate act is identical. Even the final act often bears striking resemblances. Both practices generally occur within a hospital environment, with the primary distinction being whether the patient explicitly requests the injection or administers it themselves. Ultimately, the patient's act (either through words or gesture) determines the final outcome. This thesis, therefore, argues that the distinction between assisted-suicide and euthanasia hinges on an individual's personal moral sensitivity. As a result, for the purpose of examining them from a legal perspective, it proposes that these two practices can be collectively referred to as Medically Assisted Termination of Life (MATL).

Most European countries still consider both practices criminal. However, some countries have begun to decriminalize or legalize them, like Spain¹⁸, Belgium¹⁹, Luxembourg²⁰, the Netherlands²¹, Switzerland²², Austria²³, and Germany²⁴.

16 John Griffiths, Heleen Weyers, and Maurice Adams, *Euthanasia and Law in Europe* (Oxford and Portland, Or: Hart Publishing, 2008).

17 ISOPUBLIC, "Assisted Suicide in the View of Europeans," 2013, https://www.medizinalrecht.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Results_opinion_poll_self-determination_at_the_end_of_life.pdf.

18 Cortes Generales [Spanish Parliament], "Ley Orgánica de Regulación de La Eutanasia [Organic Law Regulating Euthanasia]," Pub. L. No. 3/2021 (2021), <https://www.boe.es/eli/es/lo/2021/03/24/3>.

19 Parlement Fédéral [Belgian Parliament], "Loi Relative à l'euthanasie [Euthanasia Act]," Pub. L. No. 28/37 (2002), <http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/loi/2002/05/28/2002009590/justel>.

20 Chambre des Députés du Luxembourg [Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg], "Loi Sur l'euthanasie et l'assistance Au Suicide [Law on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide]" (2009), <https://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2009/03/16/n2/jo>.

21 Staten-Generaal [States General of the Netherlands], "Wet Toetsing Levensbeëindiging Op Verzoek En Hulp Bij Zelfdoding [Law on Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide]" (2002), <https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0012410/2021-10-01>.

22 Assemblée fédérale de la Confédération suisse [Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation], "Art. 115 'Incitation et Assistance Au Suicide' [Incitement and Assistance to Suicide]," Code Pénal [Swiss Penal Code] § (1937), https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/54/757_781_799/fr.

23 Nationalrat [Austrian National Council], "Bundesgesetz, Mit Dem Ein Sterbeverfügungsgesetz Erlassen Und Das Suchtmittelgesetz Sowie Das Strafgesetzbuch Geändert Werden [Federal Law Enacting a Dying Disposition Law and Amending the Narcotic Substances Act and the Penal Code]" (2022), https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XXVII/ME/150/imfname_1006947.pdf.

24 Bundesverfassungsgericht [German Federal Constitutional Court], Urteil zum assistierten Suizid [Judgment on assisted suicide], 153 BVerfGE 182 (Zweiter Senats [Second Senate] 2020).

Even countries that still consider both practices criminal, such as France, Portugal, and Ireland²⁵, are engaged in debates about decriminalization. The crux of this legal disagreement revolves around distinguishing euthanasia and assisted-suicide from the above-mentioned suicide and respecting the patient's refusal of life-prolonging medical treatments. While suicide entails an individual's self-provoked termination of life, assisted-suicide and euthanasia involve the active participation of a physician. Moreover, respecting the patient's refusal of life-prolonging medical treatments accounts to medical assistance at the end of life that merely hastens an expected natural death – a death that results from pre-existing conditions that will inevitably lead to death in the near term. In contrast, MATL procedures terminate a life whose end is not foreseeable in the immediate future – despite the potential presence of underlying conditions that will maybe result in death at a later time. Therefore, the participation of a doctor who not only accelerates death but actively provokes it, prevents MATL from being universally regarded as a private affair. In some situations, the State must assume the duty of protecting the patient's life.

To try to solve this quandary, this thesis proposes to study MATL as a human rights issue. In terms of human rights, the debate on MATL presents a conflict between two legal norms: the State's duty to protect life and the individual's right to privacy. The *European Convention on Human Rights*²⁶ enshrines these provisions in Articles 2²⁷ and 8^{28,29}. Individuals challenging their State's legislation on MATL, therefore, resorted to these articles and tasked the European Court of Human Rights with assessing whether the prohibition or legalization of MATL aligns with the Convention. This began with *Pretty v. the United Kingdom*³⁰ in 2002 and was most recently evaluated again in *Mortier v. Belgium*³¹ in October 2022.

To what extent does the European Court of Human Rights' interpretation of the equilibrium between the State's obligation to protect life and the individual's right to privacy in MATL allow criminalization and legalization to co-exist under its jurisdiction? This thesis addresses this research question through a case-study of the European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence on MATL, placing particular emphasis on the last case of *Mortier v. Belgium* (2022). In order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the Court's approach to MATL, this thesis also includes a meticulous examination of two other influential cases: *Pretty v. the United Kingdom* (2002) and *Haas v. Swit-*

25 Luke Hurst and Camille Bello, "Euthanasia in Europe: Where in Europe Is Assisted Dying Legal?," Euronews, December 10, 2022, <https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/12/10/where-in-europe-is-assisted-dying-legal->.

26 "European Convention on Human Rights" (1950), https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf.

27 Article 2: "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law."

28 Article 8: "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence."

29 European Court of Human Rights - Registry, "Guide on Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights" (Strasbourg: European Court of Human Rights, 2022), 2, https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_8_eng.pdf; European Court of Human Rights - Registry, "Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights" (Strasbourg: European Court of Human Rights, 2022), https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_8_eng.pdf.

30 European Court of Human Rights, *Pretty v. the United Kingdom*, No. 2346/02 (Fourth Section April 29, 2002).

31 European Court of Human Rights, *Mortier v. Belgium*, No. 78017/17 (Third Section October 4, 2022).

zerland (2011)³². By analyzing these cases, this thesis aims to contribute significantly to the existing literature on the subject, offering fresh insights and interpretations. At the core of this thesis lies the determination of the legal frameworks that the European Court of Human Rights has deemed compatible with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. The study reveals that the Court has identified two distinct legal frameworks that can be considered compliant with the Convention: (1) criminalization of MATL with flexibility in prosecution, and (2) legalization of MATL accompanied by a set of stringent regulations. This thesis argues, however, that only the latter framework – legalization of MATL with regulation – appears to be consistent with the Court’s intricate balancing act between two fundamental human rights: the State’s duty to protect life and the individual’s right to privacy. This conclusion is drawn after a careful analysis of the ECtHR’s reasoning in the three aforementioned cases, taking into account the Court’s assessment of the proportionality and necessity of the respective legal frameworks adopted by the Member States in question.

Gout, Victor. “The Right to Privacy and the State’s Duty to Protect Life in the European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence on Medically-Assisted Termination of Life.” Columbia University Academic Commons, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.7916/7vdq-7t51>

32 European Court of Human Rights, *Haas v. Switzerland*, No. 31322/07 (First Section January 20, 2011).

EUROPANOVA

Publication of EuropaNova's Scientific Committee

A tribute to Jacques Delors

Author : Guillaume KLOSSA

Guillaume Klossa is President of EuropaNova. Together with Jacques Delors, he organized the *Etats-Généraux de l'Europe* and has advised several European leaders. His latest book, «Fierté européenne, manifeste pour une civilisation d'avenir», was shortlisted for the European Book Prize 2022.

For many French people and Europeans of my generation, the first Erasmus generation, the one now in charge in most European Union countries, Jacques Delors represents the ideal type of politician, not the one of the past, but the one our countries and the European Union need more than ever today and for the future in this period of unprecedented uncertainty and transformation. A politician who is not afraid of reality or complexity, and who refuses to take the easy way out. A man who places humanity, the common good and transmission at the heart of public action, in the footsteps of Emmanuel Mounier, the Catholic philosopher and founder of *Esprit* magazine. He believed in the power of civil society to advance major political causes and combat all forms of populism. This is the sense of the tributes to Jacques Delors that have been paid to him since the announcement of his death, from Lisbon to Warsaw, via Rome, Athens and, more surprisingly, London - when we know how some British people, with the utmost bad faith, had made the former President of the European Commission the scapegoat for their detestation of the European Union - tributes that have come from almost every political persuasion in Europe.

Ursula Von der Leyen, his distant Christian Democrat successor at the head of the European Commission, has just the right words when she reminds us that the work of Social Democrat Jacques Delors has shaped generations of European citizens, right up to the present day. Everything that today represents the European Union in a positive way for our fellow citizens, whether it's the euro, the internal market, Erasmus, or freedom of movement and establishment within the Union, is largely the result of actions undertaken during his term as President of the European Commission (1985 -1995). He made no secret of the fact that his grand design was to turn Europe from a vast mercantile area into a spiritual and human adventure that would transcend individual interests. He never imagined competition without cooperation and solidarity. And if the internal market and the euro were necessary, it was first and foremost to fight against monopolies that prevented growth and were detrimental to purchasing power, but also to enable Europe to shape the world of tomorrow thanks to the strength of its economy and the power of its currency in an international order less and less governed by the West and old Europe. In his view, both the market and the euro remain incomplete constructions that need to be complemented by social and health policies and a genuine Community budget.

His last major political statement was in this vein, when on March 28, 2020, at the start of the Covid crisis, he called on European leaders for a surge of solidarity to counter the virus, thus paving the way for a European health policy, now overwhelmingly desired by European citizens, as well as for the recovery plan that helped to minimize the social effects of the economic crisis caused by the pandemic, and strengthened the European Union's budgetary capacity for the first time in four decades. None of his battles were easy, not even Erasmus, whose initiative aroused the hostility of the French Ministry of Higher Education. Legend has it that he only obtained the agreement of the French government by threatening to resign as President of the Commission.

I had the privilege of meeting Jacques Delors on several occasions. Catherine Colonna, Jacques Chirac's Minister for European Affairs at the time, had invited us both to take part in a committee of personalities to prepare the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. Two years after the French no vote in the referendum for a European Constitution, Europe was in a state of total inertia. I then suggested to Jacques Delors that he launch a «Etats-Généraux de l'Europe» to create a political dynamic that would enable Europe to be relaunched on the basis of a massive mobilization of civil society in all its diversity. With his immediate and unfailing support - and that of Sylvie Goulard, newly elected head of the European Movement - the largest demonstration of European citizens since the Hague Congress in May 1948 - was held in Lille on March 25, 2007. The outcome of these Etats-Généraux was a European pact signed by Nicolas Sarkozy and Ségolène Royal, the two candidates in the second round of the 2007 presidential election, and which the president-elect implemented during the French presidency of the European Union in 2008. Delors had asked Gaétane Ricard-Nihoul, the Belgian Secretary General of Notre Europe, and his cabinet director Jean-Pierre Bobichon, a former trade unionist, to mobilize all his networks to make the Etats-Généraux a success. He then brought Gaétane and I together to tell us that it was now up to our generation to move Europe forward, that his generation had done what it had to do, and that ours should take the initiative in writing the next chapter in the history of our continent.

Beyond his achievements and his concern to pass on his ideas, Jacques Delors' legacy is first and foremost a political method that consists in mobilizing the driving forces of society to map out a common horizon that will enable us to rise above the particular interests of the moment, and commit political leaders to action that transcends them, with the aim of implementing this shared horizon. This legacy remains extremely relevant and powerful. Beyond France's borders, leaders ranging from social democrats like Portugal's Prime Minister Antonio Costa to Christian democrats like former European Council President and new Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk have no hesitation in claiming it as their own and putting it into practice. At a time of populism and the temptation to withdraw in all directions, Jacques Delors' legacy is more than ever an invitation to action, addressed not only to political leaders, but to each and every one of us as citizens.

Contacts : Isabelle Négrier, Executive Director of EuropaNova
isabelle.negrier@europanova.eu

Laura De Almeida, Project manager
laura.dealmeida@europanova.eu
contact@europanova.eu

Website : europanova.eu
LinkedIn : EuropaNova
Instagram : [europanova](https://www.instagram.com/europanova)
Facebook : EuropaNova
X / Twitter : [@Europa_Nova](https://twitter.com/Europa_Nova)